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II. THE FACTS: PUBLIC PURPOSE, OR PFIZER'S BENEFIT?
III. WAS THE KELO DECISION NOVEL? LET THE SPINNING BEGIN
IV. INTO THE "DARK CORNER OF THE LAW" - ONCE MORE WITH
FEELING
V. 1984 PLUS 21, AND COUNTING: "PUBLIC" MEANS "PRIVATE,"
AND "USE" MEANS "PURPOSE" OR "BENEFIT," OR WHATEVER
VI. ILLUSORY REMEDY
VII. SO WHAT Do WE DO Now?




"[E]minent domain [is] a legal term meaning 'we can do anything we
want. ',1
In Kelo v. City of New London,2 a divided Supreme Court held 5 to 4
that the Fifth Amendment's "public use" limitation on condemnation of
private property poses no obstacle to takings for "economic development."3
Unlike slum clearance or blight elimination that lay a claim to the betterment
of the community, these takings are about money. They involve
condemnation of unoffending private homes, which are then razed and their
. Professor of Law Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles and Editor of Just Compensation.
The author was a co-author of an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Supreme Court that was filed on
behalf of the American Farm Bureau Federation in support of Petitioners, Susette Kelo, et al. Brief
for American Farm Bureau Federation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New
London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2787138.
1. Steve Lopez, In the Name of Her Father, TIME, July 14, 1997, at 4.
2. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
3. Id. at 2665.
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sites turned over to a private redeveloper who, in the condemning city's
opinion and in accordance with its plan, will put them to a more
economically productive private use than their current owners.4 The
rationale of such cases is that some of the private economic benefits
expected to be reaped by the redeveloper will trickle down to the community
in the form of increased tax revenues and wages, and will thus constitute a
"public benefit" which the Court equated with the Fifth Amendment's
phrase "public use."' Or, as Michael Kinsley put it with admirable brevity,
"The court ruled, 5-4, that yuppification is a valid public purpose."6 To
reach that result, the Court de facto surrendered virtually all of its power to
decide whether the proposed redevelopment constitutes a "public use" to the
very municipal agency seeking to condemn the properties in question for its
own fiscal benefit at the behest of a private, profit-seeking developer.7
Because in making such decisions cities stand to gain financially, they
inherently have a built-in conflict of interest.
The principal failing of the Kelo decision is that it misreads the case law
on which it purports to rely as a seminal precedent,8 and by its holding
frustrates the usual mode of constitutional analysis. Ordinarily, one
examines the limitations imposed by the constitutional provision in question,
and juxtaposes them with the statute, regulation, or activity in issue, to
determine if the latter is consistent with the former.9 Not so in eminent
domain, at least not now. Under Kelo one must look to the statute in
question to determine what it deems to be "public use," and then forego
4. See id. at 2658-60 (summarizing the city's plan for the economic development of New
London).
5. See id. at 2665. Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent that:
the Court today significantly expands the meaning of public use. It holds that the
sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over
for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some
secondary benefit for the public-such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even
aesthetic pleasure.
Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. Michael Kinsley, GOP Judicial Activism Takes a Hit, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2005, at M5.
7. The problem inherent in such an arrangement is that at times it is the private redeveloper, not
the public body, that initiates the project and calls the shots. For an example of how a project can be
initiated by a developer who, unable to acquire desired land by voluntary purchase, turns to the local
municipality and gets it to act as his acquisition agent, see City of Norwood v. Homey, 830 N.E.2d
381, 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
8. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's failure to
understand that Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), the case on which it
relied as the seminal precedent, was not an eminent domain case. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. Rather,
Bradley dealt with the legality of an assessment by a special district and its holding had nothing to
do with the issue of what constitutes "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment in
condemnation cases. Bradley, 164 U.S. at 178.
9. For an example of this process in action see Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190, 1194-
95, 1200 (2005) (examining the language and history of the Eighth Amendment and holding that the
execution of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment).
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testing it against the pertinent language of the Constitution unless the
condemnor's decision is so outlandish as to fail not just the test of
rationality, but of being merely rationally related to the conceivable.'0 Of
course this is no constitutional standard because as generations of science
fiction writers have demonstrated, anything can be conceived, and thus
everything is "conceivable." The Court paid lip service to the idea that
public benefits which are pretextual will not support a finding of "public
use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, but it offered no standards
by which one may determine whether the asserted benefits are pretextual."1
The Supreme Court thus de facto relegated the assertedly legislative
constitutional determination of what is "public use" to state legislatures and
beyond that to local, unelected and thus unaccountable condemning bodies,
in derogation of the familiar rule that the interpretation of the Constitution is
a judicial, not a legislative task. 12 Moreover, the problem is not so much
what is contained in an enabling legislative enactment authorizing an
application of the eminent domain power for a particular use, but how it is
applied to specific facts by local municipal functionaries who, apart from
not being legislators, are often not trained in the law, who serve local private
interests, and who lack either the intent or the mandate to pursue the broad
public interest, as opposed to the interest of the developer du jour and his
political allies in city hall.
The process created by the Supreme Court thus has a built-in
circularity. 13 Under this process, little is left to the courts to do other than de
10. This language was first used in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241
(1984), but the Court confined it by stressing that this seemingly limitless standard of review was
actually limited. Id. at 242 (stating that in order for the public use requirement to be satisfied the
state's legislature must have been able to believe rationally that its action would help achieve its
objective). The Court admonished that under that broad standard, a purely private taking would fail
under the public use limitation of the Constitution. Id. at 245. The obvious problem with that
"standard" is that under it justifications for condemnation can be conjured up after the fact, on the
basis of things that the governing body of the condemning agency never contemplated and, in light
of the prevailing local politics, never would. Even at its best, this standard of review does not
review what the condemning body does, nor even what it says, but merely what it could have
thought, even if it didn't.
11. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661 (finding that the local government would not "be allowed to take
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private
benefit").
12. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) (stating that it is the judiciary branch's
duty to "say what the law is" and that when a law and the Constitution are in opposition it is the
judiciary's job to "determine which of [the] conflicting rules governs [a] case.").
13. As understood by anyone who has attended a legislative session in which the issue of
constitutionality of pending legislation is raised, the usual response to such concerns is the assertion
by its proponents that constitutionality is an issue for the courts. The result is that legislatures defer
to courts and courts defer to the legislatures, thus playing "Alfonse and Gaston" with one another,
while the individual constitutional rights in issue go unresolved. See Brady Earnhart, After You,
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facto rubber-stamp the condemnor's decision. Thus, the Court has
constructed a process in which the constitutional mandate of "public use" is
reduced to unenforceable "hortatory fluff," as Justice O'Connor put it in her
dissenting opinion,' 4 because under that extreme level of judicial deference
that is now said to be "the law," it is the functionaries of local executive and
legislative branches of government that de facto dictate to the Supreme
Court what is "public use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This
severely undermines the concept of checks and balances in this important
area of constitutional law.
Justice O'Connor's forceful dissent argued that the majority decision,
affirming the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court, improperly
construed the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment so expansively as
to give the Court's imprimatur to the historically forbidden practice of
"tak[ing] property from A. and giv[ing] it to B .. . ."" Justice Thomas also
dissented, stressing that the field of eminent domain law has not been
subjected to doctrinal analysis and orderly growth over the years, and that
such an analysis was overdue. 16  He also noted that the majority holding
would be conducive to municipal favoritism and corruption, and would raise
the renewed danger of illegitimate use of urban renewal in a racially
discriminatory fashion to remove minority populations from coveted parts of
town, so as to earn for itself the sobriquet "Negro removal" as it did in the
1950s. 7
II. THE FACTS: PUBLIC PURPOSE, OR PFIZER'S BENEFIT?
The facts of the controversy were straightforward. The Connecticut
City of New London, suffering a from long-standing decline in population,
as do many other American cities,'8 as well as from job losses caused by
http://www.bradyeamhart.com/afteryou.html ("Alfonse and Gaston were a vaudeville duo.., who
mocked excessive politeness ....").
14. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798)).
16. See id. at 2681-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that several of the Court's previous cases
diverged from the original meaning of the public use requirement, and urging the Court to "consider
returning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause .....
17. Id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. While exploration of the decline of American cities-the usual justification for
redevelopment-would take us afield from the subject of this article and therefore cannot be pursued
here to the extent it deserves, it must be noted, if only in passing, that this decline has been ongoing
for over a half-century as the direct result of government policies adopted after World War II. Those
policies have provided incentives for Americans to leave cities and move to the suburbs, by
providing housing subsidies in the form of low interest rates, favorable tax treatment of home
ownership, government housing loan guarantees, and highways linking suburbs to cities. BERNARD
J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC-How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 11 (1989)
[hereinafter FRIEDEN & SAGALYN]. The out-migration from cities was exacerbated by factors such
as cities' deindustrialization and the attendant job losses, id. at 262, the disastrous decline of urban
public schools, forced student busing, and urban riots. Id. at 208-09. The outward population flow
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recent closures of nearby U.S. Navy installations, decided to redevelop
itself.' 9 Its problem, however, was that it lacked an upscale population
capable of patronizing and thus supporting the projected redevelopment.2z
In order to attract such a population, the city chose a 90-acre waterfront area
that was not blighted, which meant the city could not proceed under the
authority of blight removal statutes and cases such as Berman v. Parker.2 '
was further stimulated by rising urban crime and the decline in effective law enforcement,
particularly in the 1970s. Id.; see also Sam Roberts, The Year New York Lived Really Dangerously,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, § 4, at 3. Additionally, rent control reduced availability of new urban
housing acceptable and affordable to the middle class, a shortage aggravated by redevelopment
which historically has been an efficient destroyer of low- and moderate-cost urban housing. See
infra note 172-74 and accompanying text. Thus, for today's government functionaries to bemoan
the declining condition of American cities and to urge redevelopment as a cure, is not unlike the
federal government's absurd policy which denounces tobacco as detrimental to public health but
simultaneously subsidizes, and thus encourages, its production.
For an overview of the severity of the social problems that contributed to the out-migration
from the cities, see generally DAVID FRUM, How WE GOT HERE - THE '70s: THE DECADE THAT
BROUGHT YOU MODERN LIFE (FOR BETTER OR WORSE) (2000). With specific reference to the
impact of urban riots on land-use policies, see Roger Biles, Thinking the Unthinkable About Our
Cities: Thirty Years Later, 25 JOUR. URB. HIST. 57 (1998), exploring the stark choice facing
inhabitants of American cities at the time: whether to transform their communities into armed camps
or to continue moving to the suburbs. The latter view prevailed.
Though recently there has been some movement back into cities, it largely consists of
yuppies who tend to settle in selected trendy neighborhoods, and aging empty-nesters. Neither group
holds out much promise for large-scale revival of cities as viable middle class family habitats. See
Joel Kotkin, The New Suburbanism: A Realist's Guide to the American Future, THE PLANNING
CENTER, Nov. 2005, at 9-11 (arguing with support from demographic and historical data that the
suburbs are growing and thriving, while cities continue to lose population).
19. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59.
20. See id.
21. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the Supreme Court authorized the condemnation of a well-
maintained neighborhood department store, as part of an area-wide slum clearance project, to
facilitate the redevelopment of the entire Southwest quadrant of Washington, D.C. by private
redevelopers. Id. The Court held that the decision to enlist the private sector in this fashion in the
slum clearance effort was within the authority of Congress and-in a towering non sequitur-that it
was therefore within the Fifth Amendment's "public use" limitation. Id. at 31-33. Professor Ellen
Frankel Paul has aptly characterized Berman as "almost beyond redemption," a decision that
confused the regulatory police power (authorizing regulations serving the "public purpose") with the
acquisitional power of eminent domain limited by the Constitution to "public use," a linguistically
and conceptually narrower limitation on government power. ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 91 (1987). Berman confused the two powers by telescoping them
into one another, and asserting that in dealing with eminent domain the Court was dealing with the
police power, Berman, 348 U.S. at 32, a prima facie nonsensical statement treating two very
different powers of government as one. See Ernst Freund, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546-47 (1904) (explaining that property is taken by the police power
without compensation because it is harmful, but it is taken by eminent domain with compensation
because it is useful). For a useful judicial discussion of the different scope of the two powers see
City of Concord v. Stafford, 618 S.E.2d 276, 279 (N.C. App. 2005). This elementary gaffe on the
part of the Court was repeated in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) which
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Also, the redevelopment area just happened to be located next to a new
research facility of Pfizer Corporation, a major pharmaceuticals
manufacturer, and the city's redevelopment plan dovetailed with Pfizer's
private development plans.22 Thus, New London chose to rely on a statute
authorizing so-called economic redevelopment, hoping to increase taxes, add
jobs, and bring to the area new, more affluent inhabitants whose local free
spending would further contribute to the municipal economy.23 This
approach (as well as conventional redevelopment) is attractive to municipal
officials because, when successful, it enables them to point to new
construction in otherwise declining cities, and to tap new revenue streams
without the need to appropriate municipal funds, or issue general obligation
municipal bonds that would require voter approval. Instead, redevelopment
agencies issue tax-free revenue bonds that do not have full municipal faith
and credit behind them and require no voter approval. Thus, the financing
takes place off budget, without the need to impose unpopular new taxes that
may be necessary for the city's proper functioning, and indeed outside the
usual city annual budgeting and appropriation process.24
Though New London made much of its economic and demographic
decline, the rule it successfully contended for is not dependent on the
presence of any such deficient urban conditions. Under the Kelo holding,
unless restrained from doing so by state law, any municipality, even a
conspicuously prosperous one, will be able to engage in the process of
economic redevelopment. It can do so simply to enhance its already
enviable economic conditions by seizing land from its rightful owners and
conveying it to more favored persons who prognosticate that they will make
more economically productive use of it.
The Kelo case had an additional wrinkle that raised the question whether
this particular project passed the smell test. One month after the State of
Connecticut authorized the sale of $10 million in bonds to finance the city's
redevelopment planning activities, the Pfizer Corporation announced that it
would build a $300 million research facility next to New London's Fort
Trumbull area, the site of the subject redevelopment.2 ' The city worked
hand-in-glove with Pfizer,26 hoping to capitalize on the prospective influx of
asserted that the police power and eminent domain power are "coterminous," id. at 240, which they
inherently are not.
22. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
23. Actually, the City of New London delegated the task of implementing the proposed
redevelopment to the New London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity to
which the eminent domain power was delegated and which acted as the city's alter ego. In this
article, NLDC and the City are collectively referred to as "the City." See id. at 2660 n.3.
24. See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN supra note 18, at 97-98.
25. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
26. Pfizer "backed a $2 million loan to the Fort Trumbull project for working capital" and street
improvements. Eleanor Charles, Domain Challenged in New London Project, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1,
2001, § ll,at 9.
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well-paid Pfizer employees and visitors who would reside and spend their
money in the project area after its redevelopment.27 Conversely, Pfizer
expected that its presence in the community would stimulate construction of
a luxury hotel, upscale housing, and other facilities that would be agreeable
to its upscale, well-educated work force. 8
The plan called for razing the private structures in the project area and
granting Corcoran Jennison, the city's chosen redeveloper (hereafter
developer), a 99-year lease on the subject 90-acre waterfront parcel for $1
per year.29 The Connecticut state trial court approved the taking, except for
one part of the subject area, the so-called Parcel 4A which was evidently
sought to be taken for no readily discernible purpose-either to "support the
adjacent state park," or to "support the nearby marina."30 Also, the project
plan exempted from taking the Italian Dramatic Club located within the
boundaries of the project area.3 1 The trial court found that there was no
intention on the city's part to allow "an illegitimate purpose," and the
redevelopment plan was "'not adopted to benefit a particular class of
identifiable individuals.' 32  The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the
taking, but reversed the trial court's finding that Parcel 4A was not being
taken for public use, and upheld its taking too. 33 Thus, we are supposed to
take it that the city's plan meshed with regard to its contemplated uses and
its timing with Pfizer's plans3 4 as mere coincidence, or, as the trial court and
Justice Kennedy would have it, the city merely sought to "take advantage of
Pfizer's presence" and had no "desire to aid [any] particular private
entities."" But as pointed out in Justice O'Connor's dissent, the city's plan
was avowedly intended to complement Pfizer's facility.36 Moreover, giving
27. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
28. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
29. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660 n.4.
30. Id. at 2659. The U.S. Supreme Court opinion does not provide any explanation of what
support" means in this context and how it would constitute public use.
31. Id. at 2671-72 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). There is no indication in the opinion why the club
was so favored.
32. Id. at 2661-62.
33. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
34. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
35. Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the redevelopment project was "suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer corporation").
While on the facts I am inclined to agree with Justices O'Connor and Thomas (explaining that the
redevelopment project was "suspiciously agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation," Id. at 2678 (Thomas,
J., dissenting)) and I believe that this aspect of the New London project was at best dubious, it must
be noted in fairness to the Supreme Court that it only accepted the factual findings made by the trial
court, as it was required to do. Still, whoever made this dubious decision, this would appear to be an
appropriate case for invocation of the tart phrase used recently by a federal district court, that even
this transaction yet another suspicious aspect, the president of the NLDC,
who is largely credited with persuading Pfizer to put its new research
headquarters on a site adjacent to the redevelopment project, was at the time
married to Pfizer's director of research.37
In short, the taking in Kelo was manifestly planned with an eye to
facilitating the Pfizer Corporation's adjacent development, which was
envisioned by the city as the key to the success of its own redevelopment.
The question thus virtually asks itself: is this "public use"? Not by my
lights, nor, I suggest, by any standard compatible with the English language,
at least as that language may be understood by an intelligent, English-
speaking person, untutored in the arcane double-talk of eminent domain law.
This was a case, not of an independently conceived and executed municipal
redevelopment effort that incidentally benefited Pfizer when it came upon
the scene, but of a jointly planned project that would avowedly inure to
Pfizer's substantial benefit. Without Pfizer's involvement and success the
city's project concededly could not work (as there would be no free-
spending customers for the planned five-star hotel, or for the upscale
condominiums, marina, etc.). Thus the benefit to Pfizer was not incidental
but was rather an intrinsic ingredient of the plan whereby the city danced to
Pfizer's tune.38 The planning relationship between the city and Pfizer was so
though the city's actions in the redevelopment in issue there failed to pass the smell test, it was
constitutionally permissible. W. Seafood Co. v. City of Freeport, 346 F. Supp. 2d 892, 901 n.4 (S.D.
Tex. 2004).
37. David M. Herszenhom, Residents of New London Go to Court, Saying Project Puts Profits
Before Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at B5.
38. As astutely observed by Michael Kinsley, "When local government showers a big
development with money and favors, it's usually not about sovereignty but about lack of
sovereignty. Developers play jurisdictions off against one another, extracting concessions from all
that none would actually make a sovereign decision to give." Kinsley, supra note 6. A perfect
example of such concerns is provided by the veritable wars fought among California municipalities
vying with one another to induce a large automobile dealer (or better yet, an entire automobile mall)
with its high sales tax cash flow, into their redevelopment projects. See, e.g., Frank Clifford,
Pirating the Auto Retailers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at Al ("Sales taxes on cars and trucks are a
big portion of municipal revenues. So cities are luring dealerships with subsidies and cheap land.");
Siok Hian Tay Kelley, Monrovia Plans Auto Row Next to Duarte's, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, § 9,
at 1; see also Redevelopment: The Unknown Government, Municipal Officials for Redevelopment
Reform, 2004, Chap. 6, Predatory Redevelopment: Sales Tax Shell Game, at 16-17 [hereinafter
MORR Report].
Thus, it is not uncommon that because of competitive pressures and the developers' superior
bargaining skills, by the time the horse trading between a city and its chosen redeveloper is done
with, the project is not nearly as lucrative to the city as its initial rosy projections suggested. See,
e.g., Vivien Lou Chen, The Deal Is Offfor Burbank, Mall Developer, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at
Al (comparing the rosy earlier redevelopment projections, when the Burbank Media City Center
redevelopment project was started, with the fact that "the mall, which opened in 1991 and into which
the city invested $120.7 million, won't produce a dime in profit for the foreseeable future."); see
also Jodi Wilgoren, Detroit Urban Renewal Without the Renewal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2002, § 1, at
10.
Finally, shopping malls which are a favorite reuse of land taken for redevelopment can be
risky investments. See Peter H. King, Dream Unravels; Fresno: Rise and Fall of Urban Mall, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1988, § 1, at 1; Morris Newman, In Rise and Fall of Malls, Weaker Ones Get
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intertwined that at best, one cannot tell what was incidental to which, and
whether in this case the tail was wagging the dog.39
III. WAS THE KELO DECISION NOVEL? LET THE SPINNING BEGIN
The Kelo holding discarded the heretofore essential need for elimination
of undesirable conditions as a required element of condemnations involving
transfer of the taken property to private parties for their economic benefit.
Thus, Kelo makes a quantum leap in the potential applicability of the law of
eminent domain. Yet those who favor the result reached by the Court-
evidently realizing the moral indefensibility of their position and discerning
the strongly negative public reaction to it-immediately responded with a
public relation campaign, spinning the Kelo holding and urging that it was
not novel at all.
On June 24, 2005, one day after the Kelo decision came down,
Indianapolis Mayor Bart Peterson asserted on the PBS NewsHour television
program that Kelo changed nothing at all and merely affirmed the status
quo. 40 Dwight Merriam, a distinguished Connecticut land-use lawyer and
frequent CLE lecturer on land-use law, took a similar position in a Law
Seminars CLE teleconference program on July 1, 2005, making that
assertion his first, emphatically delivered point.41 And on July 14, 2005,
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky (who is a frequent constitutional commentator
but is not noted for expertise in eminent domain) appeared on a Los Angeles
radio news program to peddle the same "party line," assuring his audience
that the Kelo holding represented nothing new at all and merely restated the
law as it has been in the past.42 Not content with that, Professor
Chemerinsky also took to the pages of the California Bar Journal, opining
that Kelo was the most misrepresented case of the year, having been
'Demalled', L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at AI; Timothy Egan, Retail Darwinism Puts Old Malls in
Jeopardy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000, at A20; Peter T. Kilbom, An Enormous Landmark Joins
Graveyard of Malls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at A10; see also Regus v. City of Baldwin Park,
139 Cal. Rptr. 196, 205 (Ct. App. 1977) (discussing the economic pitfalls in redevelopment mall
operations that, inter alia, improperly put public funds at risk); see also infra note 186 and
accompanying text.
39. Case law takes the position that takings which benefit private parties are permissible under
the Public Use clause, provided the private benefit is merely "incidental" to the public purpose. See,
e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Anthony, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308, 310 (Ct. App. 1964).
40. NewsHour (PBS television broadcast June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/an-june05/property-6-24.html.
41. Dwight Merriam, Remarks during a Law Seminars Continuing Legal Education
teleconference (July 1, 2005).
42. The Supreme Court and Its Future (KPCC radio broadcast July 14, 2005), available at
http://www.scpr.org/programs/talkcity/listings/2005/07/totc_20050711 .shtml.
presented by the media as "a dramatic change in the law, while in reality the
Court applied exactly the principle that was articulated decades ago.,
43
Murray Kane, a prominent Los Angeles lawyer for redevelopment agencies,
was quoted as saying "[w]e don't see [Kelo] as an expansion of eminent
domain powers, but as an underpinning of the current powers that cities and
redevelopment agencies have.",4 4 Richard K. Tranter, a lawyer in an Ohio
firm representing the developer in the notorious Norwood redevelopment
case, opined that Kelo's critics were misguided, and offered the canard that
condemnees are "generously" compensated.45  My favorite, and
unintentionally funny, comment came from the Brookings Institution which
in a notable example of postmodern babble, expressed its admiration of the
Kelo decision as enhancing "holistic redevelopment," whatever that means.46
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, never has so much been said by so many
in defense of so little-at least little according to them.
Probably the most revealing insight into the mentality of Kelo's
supporters was unwittingly provided by Richard Lazarus of Georgetown
University, opining in the National Law Journal that the most striking aspect
of Kelo was that it was considered "such a big deal., 47 Eminent domain, he
said, unwittingly contradicting reams of legal scholarship published over a
period of decades, is a very settled area of law, and the strong public
reaction to Kelo was an "extraordinary PR job by the property rights
movement., 48  That someone of Professor Lazarus' intelligence found it
difficult to believe that the people would be aghast at the realization that any
developer may come along and, working hand-in-glove with compliant city
functionaries, can have their unoffending homes bulldozed to the ground for
yet another mall, and that a strong public reaction to such a turn of events
had to be inspired by the PR doings of a nefarious "movement" rather than
being a spontaneous reaction of sensible people, tells us a great deal more
about Professor Lazarus and the American professorial elites of which he is
a part than about the law of eminent domain.
43. Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court: The Calm Before the Storm, CAL. B.J., Aug. 2005, at 1,
18.
44. David G. Savage, Justices Back Forced Sale of Property, L.A. TIMES, Jun.24, 2005 at Al.
45. Richard B. Tranter, Court Was Right to Uphold Takings, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Aug.
8, 2005, at 6. On the subject of asserted generosity of compensation, see JACQUES B. GELIN &
DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 47-99 (Stephen R. Saltzburg &
Kenneth R. Redden eds., 1982), cataloging the many economic detriments that are not compensable
in eminent domain.
46. In Support of Eminent Domain, The Brookings Institution, Jul. 12, 2005,
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/eminentdomain.htm.
47. Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Review: A Changing Landscape, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 2005, at
7. For a review of the rising ferment in right-to-take decisional law during the years preceding Kelo,
see cases discussed in Gideon Kanner, Developments in Right-to-Take Law, 2002 INST. ON PLAN.
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 2-22 through 2-34. Also see infra note 158.
48. Id.
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This oddly counterintuitive position of the American left which
traditionally professes to side with "the little guy" in opposition to large
corporate interests appears to be rooted in this case in a knee-jerk opposition
to whatever it perceives as favored by American conservatives and
libertarians. 49  Thus, liberal San Francisco congresswoman and House
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, opined that when the Supreme Court ruled
against Suzette Kelo it was "almost as if God had spoken., 50 There is no
record of Congresswoman Pelosi similarly ascribing divine attributes to past
Supreme Court opinions in which property owners prevailed. God, it would
seem, is a San Francisco liberal.
Contrary to all this spinning of Kelo as a no-big-deal case, it was greeted
with dismay by a broad section of the American public. As Professor
Douglas Kmiec put it, "[t]he Court's stature plummeted when it endorsed
taking private property for private use." 51 A poll conducted by Quinnipiac
University showed by a huge margin (89% to 8%) that people are
overwhelmingly opposed to the use of eminent domain for economic
redevelopment.12 Douglas Schwartz, head of the poll was quoted as saying
that he has never seen such a lopsided margin on any issue he has polled. 3
Similarly, a poll conducted by the University of New Hampshire found that
93% of those polled opposed using eminent domain for private
development.1
4
By my lights, if any organized action by a "movement" is afoot here, it
is the effort of Kelo's supporters to defuse the wave of popular outrage that
has swept the country in response to the Kelo decision.5 The bland-faced
49. See Matt Welch, The Left's Eyeing Your Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at M6.
50. Id.
51. Douglas W. Kmiec, Abandoning Common Sense, CAL. LAW., Sep. 2005, at 21, 21.
52. Michael Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain Uproar Imperils Projects, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 3, 2005, at BI.
53. Id.
54. Welch, supra note 49.
55. For a sampling of the vigorous public reactions, see Hands Off Our Homes, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 20-26, 2005, at 21, 21-22; Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al; Maura Kelly Lannan, Many States See a Push to Limit Property
Seizures, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), July 20, 2005, at 7; Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2005, at A14 (describing the Kelo ruling as "shameful" and "scandalous and cruel .... );
Virginia Groark, Connecticut Case Lit Fires of Rage, CH1. TRIB., July 18, 2005, at 12; Donald
Lambro, Home, Seized Home, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at A16 (reporting a nation-wide
legislative backlash); Editorial, Court Cripples Property Rights, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 24,
2005, at Editorial Page ("This decision is perverse. The five Justices in the majority should be
ashamed") (emphasis omitted); Editorial, The Little People Get Hit, PROVIDENCE J., June 24, 2005,
at B4 ("This does not sound like a victory for democracy or fairness .. "); Editorial, Dark Days
Ahead for Property Owners, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 24, 2005, at 48A ("lamentable decision");
Editorial, Court Puts Our Property In Jeopardy, BOWLING GREEN DAILY NEWS June 25, 2005
position that takings overtly serving private economic purposes have been
permitted in the past5 6 so what's the fuss all about?, is disingenuous and at
best a gross oversimplification of what Kelo decided. Actually, there is
much in the Court's handiwork that is new and that is subject to valid
criticism. Originally, the use of eminent domain to benefit private parties
was permitted in what the Supreme Court stressed was a narrow exception,
when its use eliminated seriously undesirable conditions, such as obstacles
to efficient natural resource exploitation. 7 Later, this approach was extended
to elimination of slums and urban blight, misallocation of land titles, and the
like.5 ' Kelo abandoned that requirement entirely and, to that extent, is quite
novel. Kelo thus represents another step down the slippery slope of the U.S.
Supreme Court's right-to-take law,5 9 and another battle lost by property
("This assault on [the voters'] property rights is highly offensive to most fair minded people.");
Editorial, Error in Judgment, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, June 27, 2005, at Al 8 ("shameful decision");
Edward Hudgins, Your Castle No More, WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A20 ("Kelo v. New
London is another giant step toward classical corporatism or fascism in America."); Editorial,
Condemnation, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 24, 2005 ("The U.S. Supreme Court appeared.., to
declare open season on private property .... ").
In contrast, the two flagship liberal newspapers were cheering editorially for the new Robber
Barons. The Washington Post opined that the Kelo decision was "quite unjust" but "the court's
decision was correct," Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30. The New
York Times opined, in spite of the Times' blatant conflict of interest (it is the beneficiary of a
municipal land-acquisition in mid-Manhattan for a new, subsidized headquarters building which it
has an option to acquire after 30 years for "nominal consideration"; see Paul Moses, The Paper of
Wreckage: The 'Times' Bulldozes Its Way to a Sweetheart Land Deal You Will Pay For, Village
Voice, Jun. 22, 2002, at 35), and in spite of its acknowledgement that the Kelo plan "may hurt a few
small property owners," that the municipal victory in Kelo was just dandy, asserting that the New
London condemnees will be "fully compensated." Editorial, The Limits of Property Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A22. This is a false statement, as anyone acquainted with eminent domain
compensation law knows full well. See City of New London v. Foss & Burke, Inc., 857 A.2d 370
(Conn. App. 2004) (denying compensation for the full value of a condemnee's fixtures, as well as
for its business losses and attorney's fees). Moreover, adding to its hypocritical performance, the
New York Times is on record editorially as opposing full indemnity to condemnees. See Editorial,
Governor Chiles's Everglades Moment, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1998, at A24 (characterizing Florida
law that provides for reimbursement of attorneys' fees to condemnees as "a clever piece of
larceny").
56. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the use of eminent
domain to eliminate oligopolistic feudal title misallocations was permissible); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that the taking of land for purposes of slum clearance was permissible);
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906) (holding that the condemnation of
an easement for an aerial tramway serving a mine, to eliminate an obstacle to efficient mineral
exploitation, was permissible); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (holding that the exploitation of
arid agricultural land, which otherwise would remain unproductive and fallow, justified a taking by a
neighbor to enlarge the latter's irrigation ditch).
57. See Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75
N.D. L. REv. 783, 793-94 (1999).
58. Id.; see also Gov't of Guam v. Moylan, 407 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1969) (taking of war-ravaged
urban land to allow its replatting in preparation for reconstruction).
59. As Will Rogers might have put it, the U.S. Supreme Court has never met a condemnation it
didn't like and, to my knowledge, no condemnee has won on the issue of lack of public use in the
U.S. Supreme Court in the past three-quarters of a century. See cases cited supra note 56; see also
Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) (upholding a taking of one
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owners in the judicial jihad against private property rights in America,
which began in the New Deal era and has continued in the past quarter-
century.
If you wonder who has the better argument in this dispute over what
Kelo decided, and whether its holding is indeed novel, read the opinions and
ask yourself: if it's as cut-and-dried as fans of the Kelo decision would have
it, why did it take the Supreme Court 100 years to articulate the rule that
mere municipal prognostications of economically better use by the
condemned land's transferee, without more, meet the "public use" limitation
of the Constitution? Why, unlike past unanimous decisions on this subject,
was the Kelo Court so sharply divided? And if prior law was all that clear,
then why did Justice O'Connor dissent in Kelo, protesting the majority's
misuse of her opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midklff 6 ° and why did
she argue that in Midkiff she did not approve of unrestricted private takings?
More importantly, if Kelo's fans think they are gaining a public relations
advantage with their spin, trying to convince the populace that it is business
as usual, they are only making an argument that proves too much. If they
are right, that would mean only that the populace, thus far ignorant of the
ways in which redevelopment is actually used (as opposed to the familiar
newspaper fairy tales about slum clearance), has for the first time glimpsed
the grim reality and is justifiably incensed at the idea that any influential
redeveloper can have anyone kicked out of his or her home or business, and
take its site over on no more than a prognostication of its lucrative reuse
triggering a trickle-down process into the local economy. If that is supposed
to be an argument likely to enlist the people on the side of the new Robber
Barons, it is certainly making its appearance in a convincing disguise. It
does however illustrate the contempt in which Kelo's fans must hold the
intelligence of their fellow Americans. 61  The people's attention may be
directed toward enjoying the pleasures of life (which, lest we forget, include
railroad's trackage in order to convey it to another railroad); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth.
v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946) (implementing an expansive Court interpretation of a statute to allow
the TVA to condemn land in excess to the reservoir for which other land was being legitimately
taken); Dept. of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996) (summarily reversing South
Dakota v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1996), where the circuit court
denied the federal government the right to condemn land "for Indians," without more). An
exception of sorts was Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930), where a municipal condemnation
was interdicted on statutory grounds because the city was engaging in the forbidden practice of
excess condemnation. See generally ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN, EXCESS CONDEMNATION (1917)
(discussing excess condemnation from the standpoint of the American city).
60. 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
61. One measure of the public reaction to Kelo is that it precipitated a flood of proposed
legislation to curb its reach. For a comprehensive list of such legislation, see Donald E. Sanders &
Patricia Pattison, The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 157, 171-75 (2005).
enjoyment of their homes), but they are much smarter than Kelo's fans give
them credit for, and they do understand that what just happened in America
is a watershed event: a judicial endorsement of a government policy that is
nothing short of reverse Robin Hoodery, whereby, as Justice O'Connor put
it, "the government now has license to transfer property from those with
fewer resources to those with more."62 The Kelo majority opinion is widely
and correctly perceived as being in the nature of an unwarranted judicial
declaration of war on the American home-owning public, with the public
reaction responding appropriately to this development.
One is left to speculate on how much more fierce the public reaction
will likely be when the people at large learn that redevelopment not only
threatens their homes, but also skims their property taxes, and diverts them
from municipal treasuries to redeveloper subsidies. This occurs through the
device of so-called TIF (tax increment financing) bonds, which are sold by
city redevelopment agencies to high-income investors seeking tax-free
income, and their proceeds are used to fund redevelopment. These bonds
are then paid off by skimming the new property taxes generated by the
redevelopment project area and diverting them away from the usual
municipal expenditures (such as schools, fire and police protection, and the
like) into the coffers of redevelopment agencies that use those funds to repay
the bonds and to fund new redevelopment schemes that inherently subsidize
wealthy redevelopers.63
The topsy-turvy morality of the real "political ethics '64 said to be
reflected in the law of eminent domain, the "dark comer of the law" as
Lewis Orgel put it a half-century ago in his treatise,65 is thus well illustrated
by the spectacle of avowedly liberal members of the Supreme Court
enlisting themselves in the cause of a new class of Robber Barons using
government power to pursue private wealth on the backs of poor tenants and
lower-middle-class home owners. The problem is exacerbated by the fact
that redevelopment has had a long and inglorious history of open racism and
abuse of those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. The poor
62. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Doug Kaplan, Overmalled, Underschooled, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1996, at BI 1 ("Someone
needs to tell the state's 350 redevelopment agencies that ... the key to economic development in
California isn't more shopping centers-it's better schools."). For a concise description of how such
municipal high finance works, see FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 97-98 (characterizing as
a "redevelopment director's dream" the fact that this process exempts redevelopment agencies from
the annual budget appropriation scrutiny and permits large scale municipal expenditures to take
place off budget, without voter approval [or knowledge]). For a detailed description of the
complexities of various kinds of financing of redevelopment projects, see DAVID F. BEATTY, ET AL,
REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA, 209-42 (3d ed. 2004). See also MORR Report, supra note 38, at
12 (reporting that between 1995 and 2003 bonded indebtedness by California redevelopment
agencies rose from $5 billion to $56 billion).
64. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (stating that eminent domain law is said to
be based on "political ethics").
65. 2 LEWIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 248 (1953).
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and lower middle-class people, who are forcibly displaced by urban renewal
without compensation for all their demonstrable economic losses, are the
very people who are supposed to be the objects of a benign government
housing policy, but whose vital interests in a family home are in fact
ignored. That, to say the least, is an unfortunate display of moral blindness
on the part of the majority Justices.
Beyond Kelo's shift in legal doctrine, the judicial attitude displayed
there, and in its all-too-evident subtext, supports the surmise that the
signatories of the majority opinion are at the very least uninformed as to how
the power of eminent domain is actually exercised in America, and how it
impacts individuals vainly seeking the protection of the constitutional
limitations on government power to take private property. They remain
mired in a nineteenth century vision of eminent domain law that no longer
has validity.66
In the end, Kelo's fans' reliance on "precedent" does not really support
their position (as shown presently), but it does bring to mind Jonathan
Swift's celebrated criticism of lawyers:
It is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done
before may legally be done again: and therefore they take special
care to record all the decisions formerly made against common
justice, and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name
of 'precedents,' they produce as authorities, to justify the most
iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of decreeing
accordingly.67
IV. INTO THE "DARK CORNER OF THE LAW" - ONCE MORE WITH FEELING
Kelo was not only about constitutional rights in general and property
rights in particular, but also about the meaning of the English language,
specifically of the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment, whose
66. The line of cases relied on by the Kelo majority is rooted in nineteenth century law that
developed from occasional takings of strips of farmland for railroad rights-of-way and other
easements-a process that usually displaced no one's home and that did not even resemble the
modem urban redevelopment and its mass displacement of urban populations that has given rise to
social, economic, and other problems unheard of when that nineteenth century law was formulated.
For a description of pre-Civil War railroad right-of-way condemnations, when unsophisticated
farmers were taken advantage of and induced to give away their land to the railroads gratis, see 1
JOHN SHERMAN, JOHN SHERMAN'S RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND
CABINET 81 (Chicago, The Werner Co. 1895).
67. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 269 (Arthur E. Case ed., Ronald Press Co. 1938)
(1726).
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meaning in the law has by now been corrupted to a virtually Orwellian
extent. I believe there is great merit in Confucius' admonition that the most
important function of government is rectification of names; of seeing to it
that things are called by their proper names.68 Otherwise, the resulting
confusion has an adverse effect on civic and even artistic values, makes
court judgments unjust, and leaves the people at a complete loss.
As noted, in Kelo the Court jettisoned the precondition to the exercise of
eminent domain for the benefit of private parties that was first formulated in
Clark v. Nash69 and Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.7° In those
cases, the Court justified takings of easements over strips of private land, in
order to benefit private parties seeking to put their own land to economically
more productive, but concededly private commercial uses (respectively,
expansion of a private irrigation ditch and construction of an aerial tramway
serving a privately owned mine), as meeting the "public use" requirement.71
In allowing such takings, the Court relied on dire necessity to prevent public
harm, which it deemed to justify the carving out of a narrow exception to the
"public use" limitation.72 Without such takings, said the Court, agriculture
and mining in Utah would be frustrated, and potentially productive land
would remain barren.73 As a result, the Court thought it necessary to go
along with the private condemnors who prognosticated otherwise
unobtainable economic benefits for the region that would result from their
enhanced agricultural and mining activities.74 The first step down the
slippery slope was thus taken, and "public use" became transmogrified into
"public benefit" said to arise indirectly from conferring the power of
eminent domain on private parties avowedly acting for their own financial
68. RICHARD WILHELM, CONFUCIUS AND CONFUCIANISM 50-51 (1931).
69. 198 U.S. 361,369-70 (1905). Note that the Clark Court relied on Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradely, 164 U.S. 122 (1896) because it believed that Fallbrook was a condemnation case. See
Clark, 198 U.S. at 269. However, Clark mistakenly relied on Fallbrook because Fallbrook was not
a condemnation case. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
70. 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
71. Id.; Clark, 198 U.S. at 370.
72. Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531 ("While emphasizing the great caution necessary to be shown, [the
earlier decision of Clark] proved that there might be exceptional times and places in which the very
foundations of public welfare could not be laid without requiring concessions from individuals to
each other upon due compensation .... ) (emphasis added).
73. Clark, 198 U.S. at 369-70.
74. Id.
[W]e do not desire to be understood by this decision as approving of the broad
proposition that private property may be taken in all cases where the taking may promote
the public interest and tend to develop the natural resources of the State. We simply say
that in this particular case, and upon the facts stated in the findings of the [trial] court,
and having reference to the conditions already stated, we are of opinion that the use is a
public one, although the taking of the right of way is for the purpose simply of thereby
obtaining the water for an individual, where it is absolutely necessary to enable him to
make any use whatever of his land, and which will be valuable and fertile only if water
can be obtained.
Id. (emphasis added).
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gain, but prognosticating regional prosperity on a trickle-down theory.75
Whatever the soundness vel non of that justification, it deviated from the
express language of the Constitution which speaks of "public use," not
"public benefit. 76
Moreover, a moment's reflection makes clear that the court's
conjectured "absolute necessity" justification 7 was, at most, of dubious
merit. The American West was developed on a vast scale without neighbors
preying on one another by the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In
other words, the Court's uncritical acceptance of the supposed dire necessity
argument was unjustified because it de facto envisioned a Hobbesian society
in which ranchers, farmers, and miners, rather than relying on their own
efforts aided by government regulations adjusting their rights vis-a-vis one
another, are at war with each other over local land and water resources. It is
one thing to say that the government may regulate and even condemn water
resources in order to allocate them under a rational, legislative plan, but it is
quite another thing to countenance an unvarnished, private grab of a
neighbor's land for the benefit of an individual who, for all the pretty words
about dire necessity and public benefit, is responsible to no one, save only
his own commercial self-interest and his own notions of where enlightened
self-interest ends and greed begins.
Whatever the merits (or lack thereof) of this justification of dire
necessity, it was either insincere or merely formulated for the occasion,78
and it was not applied in later cases. Some dozen years after Clark and
Strickley, the Court made it official-necessity is not a factor in federal law
of eminent domain.79  Most state courts today tend to hold (while
interpreting state statutory necessity requirements) that the determination of
necessity is the condemnor's prerogative, subject to only minimal judicial
review unless otherwise provided by the legislature. 0 Nonetheless there are
75. See id.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. Clark, 198 U.S. at 370.
78. For example, the Court spoke "in this particular case." See supra note 74. Moreover, as
pointed out in Justice Thomas' Kelo dissent, in both Clark and Strickley the taken easements were
usable not only by their owners, but also by the public, and this met the use-by-the-public version of
the "public use" constitutional limitation. See Strickley, 200 U.S. at 532. Thus, the Court's
intellectual misadventure, going on about the economic necessity justification for the taking, was
unnecessary to the decision. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2683-84 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919) (holding that a determination of necessity for a
taking is a non-judicial legislative matter, with the condemnee not even entitled to a hearing
thereon).
80. Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 702 (1923) (holding that state law may
constitutionally deem the condemnor's self-serving determination of necessity to be conclusive).
occasional judicial decisions finding a lack of necessity. Yet courts are
reluctant to interfere with a condemnor's determination of necessity, lest
they find themselves called upon to second-guess planning and engineering
decisions-such as proper location of project boundaries, the extent of rights
of way, and the like-thereby becoming embroiled in technical matters
beyond their competence.81  While this is the conventional wisdom
explanation of this facet of eminent domain law, I question its soundness (or
possibly its bona fides) for two reasons. First, when the legislature
determines that necessity is freely justiciable, the courts experience no
difficulty adjudicating condemnors' compliance with the statutory standards
of necessity. 82 Second, and even more revealing, the courts do not even
pretend to experience any undue difficulties when reviewing highly
technical environmental impact reports that delve into engineering and
planning decisions concerning transportation, traffic, water supplies, waste
disposal, air quality, pollution sources, endangered species protection, etc.,
and freely pass judgment on the quality and completeness of the handiwork
of engineers, scientists, planners and the like, frequently disagreeing with
their conclusions.83 Why courts abruptly lose the capacity to do so when the
litigation is labeled "eminent domain" rather than "environmental review"
no one has, to the best of my knowledge, attempted to explain. Thus, it is
open to question why such judicial self-abnegation is prevalent in eminent
domain cases (but in no others). For example, one finds it hard to fathom
why the California Supreme Court, at the time a court well regarded for its
commitment to fairness, took the harsh, extremist position that
determinations of public necessity are not justiciable at all, not even when
the condemnor's resolution of necessity is procured through fraud, bad faith
or abuse of discretion.84
The classic elements of public necessity in eminent domain law are codified in Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1240.030 as the condemnor's findings that: "(1) The public interest and necessity require the
project. (2) The project is planned or located in a manner that will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury. (3) The property sought to be acquired is necessary
for the project." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (a)-(c) (West 1982); See 1 NORMAN E.
MATI EONI ET AL., CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 6.22 (2d ed. 2002).
81. For example, as the Court noted in Kelo:
It is not for the courts ... to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once
the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to
be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan
rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
82. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (finding itself
unconstrained by statutes making the determination of necessity conclusive, the court refused to
accept the city's finding of necessity and charged it with profligacy); see also SFPP, L.P. v.
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a lack of
necessity to condemn).
83. See, e.g., Fuel Safe Wash. v. F.E.R.C., 389 F.3d 1313, 1326 (10th Cir. 2004).
84. People v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (Cal. 1959). To its credit, in 1975, upon learning
from the California Law Revision Commission that the court had imputed to it the intent to
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V. 1984 PLUS 21, AND COUNTING: "PUBLIC" MEANS "PRIVATE," AND
"USE" MEANS "PURPOSE" OR "BENEFIT," OR WHATEVER
Roughly a half-century after Clark and Strickley the chickens came
home to roost. In Berman v. Parker,85 the notorious Washington D.C. case
that became the granddaddy of modem urban redevelopment law, the
justification for the taking was slum clearance. People of my generation
remember those black-and-white photos in high school civics books, whose
captions lamented the fact that the United States of America, the wealthiest
nation in the world, tolerated such slums within sight of the Capitol dome. 6
In Berman, the Court held that it was the elimination of those slums, and of
the attendant adverse social conditions, that constituted the "public use," or
more accurately, the "public benefit" that justified the condemnation.87 The
idea that the constitutional phrase "public use" actually meant public use,
had, by then, gone the way of the whalebone corset, but Berman purported
to provide a doctrinal justification for this change.
The Berman court faced the novel issue of whether the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment permitted a wholesale taking of hundreds of
urban dwellings in the Southwest quadrant of Washington, D.C., razing
them, and turning over their sites to private redevelopers who would then
build new improvements on the cleared land for their private, profit-making
purposes.8  The Court held that it did. 9 Slum clearance was the object of
the law, said Justice Douglas in the unanimous Berman opinion, and
condemnation of the entire area was merely the means chosen by Congress
to achieve that end. 90 Once the object of the legislation is legitimate, it
justifies the means chosen to achieve it.9' Yes, the Court said it: the end
justifies the means-a proposition not usually heard in other areas of
constitutional law. What happens to the taken land after its acquisition by
the condemnor is of no concern to the condemnees because, wrote Justice
Douglas, their rights are observed when they receive their "just
countenance fraud in determinations of public necessity in transactions of this type, an incensed
legislature abrogated the Chevalier holding. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255 (West 1982)
(stating that resolution not conclusive when procured by "gross abuse of discretion"); see also §
1245.270 (West 1982) (stating that resolution not conclusive when procured by bribery).
85. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
86. See Linda Wheeler, Broken Ground, Broken Hearts, WASH. POST, Jun. 21, 1999, at Al
(describing sympathetically life in pre-Berman Southwest Washington).
87. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33.
88. Id. at 28-30.
89. Id. at 36.
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id. at 33.
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compensation., 92 Of course, this was a false premise on two counts. First,
the property owner objected to the taking as not being for public use, not to
the measure of compensation. 93 Second, like the Holy Roman Empire of
yore that was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire, the constitutionally
promised "just compensation" is neither just nor is it compensation-a state
of affairs which is not rationally contestable and whose existence the Court
has conceded in moments of candor. 94 To quote Professor Merrill's accurate
observation, "[t]he most striking feature of American compensation law-
even in the context of formal condemnation or expropriation-is that just
compensation means incomplete compensation." 95  Though the Kelo
majority took note of this problem in footnote 2 1,96 it declined to address the
compensation issues.
The legal bottom line of Berman is that when privately-owned land is
taken to eliminate adverse social conditions (in that case, slums), it is that
elimination, not necessarily the subsequent reuse of the taken land, that
satisfies the "public use" requirement. 97 Notwithstanding that the building
housing Berman's store was not blighted, the Court approved of its taking to
allow an area-wide redevelopment that would be hampered if the
redevelopers had to approach their task in a parcel-by-parcel fashion. 98
Similarly, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,99 the undesirable
social condition that the local legislature sought to eliminate through the use
of eminent domain was said to be an oligopolistic state of freehold title land
ownership patterns on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, resulting from remnants
92. Id. at 36. Note that in the Kelo oral argument, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that in
Berman, Justice Douglas "spoke very expansively." Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Kelo v. City
of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
93. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
94. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945) (stating that the law of
eminent domain is "harsh"); Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (conceding that "fair
market value," which is the usual measure of "just compensation," fails to take into consideration
factors that buyers and sellers in a voluntary transaction would consider in fixing the agreed upon
price, thus inherently undercompensating condemnees). For an exploration of market value and its
deficiencies as opposed to just compensation, see generally Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight:
Just How Just Is Just Compensation? 48 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 765, 772-781 (1973). See also Ann
E. Gergen, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 181
(1993)
95. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, II N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 111
(2002).
96. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 n.21 (2005).
97. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
98. Id. at 35. The Court never explained why administrative convenience of redevelopment
planners should trump an explicit constitutional provision. Moreover, the Court glossed over the
fact that the "area wide" approach to slum clearance was less than uniform. At least two buildings
on Southwest Fourth Street (a Civil War hospital and the former home of Ernie Pyle) were left
standing. I know. I lived across the street from them in 1962-64. Also, two seafood restaurants and
a pizza joint were left standing and were operating a decade after Berman was decided.
99. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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of feudal Royal Hawaiian land tenure.' 00 Many Hawaiian home owners
could not buy the land on which their homes stood and could only lease their
plots under long term leases.'0 ' The land had been left by the last member of
Hawaiian royalty, Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, to a charitable trust
whose function was to keep the land, make it economically productive, and
use the proceeds to support the Kamehameha Schools dedicated to providing
a superior education to Hawaiian children.102 To that end the Bishop Estate
leased its land, and did so at below-market rates. In an effort to curry favor
among the suburban population, the Hawaii legislature had determined that
the prevalence of leasehold estates in the real estate market limited
availability of freehold land, causing an increase in housing prices, and that
conversion of leaseholds into freehold titles would curb that tendency.
10 3
Significantly, this Hawaii legislation did not apply to other, similar land
trusts whose trustees had devoted their land to agricultural and commercial
uses.' °4 Of course, this legislative determination was economic nonsense.
While ownership of land in fee simple may be satisfying and preferable to
home owners for a variety of reasons, leaseholds inherently convey less than
the fee simple interest, and are therefore cheaper than freehold titles that
convey all the land owner has. Thus, it is difficult to see how the Hawaii
legislature could rationally suppose that conversion of leaseholds to freehold
titles would cause a drop in the cost of housing, since it could not affect the
supply of housing.
As a historical sideline, it should be noted that the market had a rude
surprise in store for the would-be Hawaiian reformers. In a classic
illustration of Murphy's Law in action, following Midkiff the sudden
availability of desirable residential freehold land on Oahu inspired
prospering Japanese investors (whose Yen currency was at the time rising as
against the sinking dollar) to snap up local homes, particularly in the Kahala
neighborhood, Oahu's choice area, for what to them were reasonable sums,
but what to the local residents were fortunes.'0 5 Prices of a million dollars
100. Id. at 232-33. "As the unique way titles were held in Hawaii skewed the land market,
exercise of the power of eminent domain was justified." Id. at 244.
101. Id. at 242 (noting that "[tihe land oligopoly has... forced thousands of individual
homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.").
102. See Georgia Ka'apuni McMillen, A School of One's Own, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at
A19 (describing the tradition and operation of the Kamehameha schools).
103. See Midkiff v. Tom, 471 F. Supp. 871, 874 n.13 (D. Haw. 1979).
104. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229 n.1 (noting that an eligible tenant under the Hawaii statute is "one
who, among other things, owns a house on the lot, [and] has a bona fide intent to live on the lot or be
a resident of the State ....").
105. See John Duchemin, Rediscovering Hawaii, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 2000, at IG
(describing how Japanese investors were able to purchase Hawaiian real estate in the 1980s).
and up were readily paid by Japanese investors for ordinary, aging suburban
bungalows which were then tom down by the buyers and replaced with
luxurious homes that were sold to Japanese tycoons as vacation homes, and
thus were occupied only part-time, adding to Oahu's housing shortage.
10 6
The upshot of the legislation upheld in Midkiff was thus a dramatic increase,
not a decrease, in home prices, contributed to by the former Kahala
homeowners who, having sold their homes to eager Japanese buyers for a
pretty penny, fanned out across Oahu in search of suitable replacement
homes, causing the familiar price ripple effect. 107 Thus, the effect of the law
was perverse. Instead of lowering, or at least maintaining home prices, it
accomplished the opposite. It fueled a wholesale transfer of desirable homes
to Japanese investors and provided huge economic incentives for the former
land lessees to sell their homes and become instant millionaires. Thus,
ironically, the law enacted in the name of providing lessee-homeowners with
fee titles to their homesites caused the transfer of some of America's most
desirable residential land into the hands of foreigners.
But when the Court spoke in Midkiff all of that still lay in the future,
and as Justice O'Connor explained, the fact that the legislature may be
wrong, does not make its enactments any less binding. 108  Unfortunately,
Justice O'Connor cast her ruling in needlessly extreme language. She
opined that the court had not and presumably would not interfere in state
takings as long as the legislatively stated public purpose was rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose. 109 This is an extreme standard
106. Because the preferred Japanese investment strategy (at least at the time) favored low-yield
long-term investments extending over the investors' and their progeny's lifetimes, Japanese
investors were not interested in acquiring temporally limited leasehold interests, but their motivation
changed abruptly when they could invest in Hawaii freehold titles.
107. See Charlotte Low Allen, The Golden Land Rush, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Oct. 29, 1990, at
15-19. Allen explains how the "Japanese buyers and the Hermes scarf-draped Caucasian real estate
ladies [ ] skitter through the [Oahu] neighborhood[s] like nene geese every Sunday." Id. at 16.
108. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-43. But query whether the Hawaii
legislature was merely wrong or irrational by supposing that fee simple titles would be cheaper than
leaseholds. Query also whether the adverse title conditions prevailing on Oahu were caused by the
"skewed" market, or by widespread pattern of government ownership of land that was thus
unavailable for housing construction, to say nothing of the supply-limiting, notoriously restrictive
Hawaiian land-use laws. Id. at 244. See DAVID L. CALLIES, REGULATING PARADISE 173-75 (1994).
109. Id. at 241. With all due respect to the courts applying that standard, it is absurd because
under it, a court can uphold condemnations for fictitious reasons that never occurred to the persons
in charge of the condemning body when it resolved to pursue the condemnation, and that may be
contrary to what they intended or would acquiesce in even if it had occurred to them. Under it the
courts review, not what the condemnor resolved or intended, but what it might have intended had its
members been as ingenious as Supreme Court Justices acting with the benefit of hindsight. As the
Ninth Circuit put it:
If officials could take private property, even with adequate compensation, simply by
deciding behind closed doors that some other use of the property would be a 'public use,'
and if those officials could later justify their decision in court merely by positing 'a
conceivable public purpose' to which the taking is rationally related, the 'public use'
provision of the Takings Clause would lose all power to restrain government takings.
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996).
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which, in a stroke of poetic justice, O'Connor had to eat in the Kelo case
where she wound up vainly protesting in her dissent that she did not intend
to go that far in her Midkiff opinion."' This brings to mind Yogi Berra's
bon mot "I really didn't say everything I said.""'
In a way, it was a case of just deserts for Justice O'Connor because her
jurisprudence has been, to put it politely, unmoored to legal doctrine. As
Slate's Dahlia Lithwick put it,
O'Connor has become famous for her tendency to decide cases
narrowly, more in the manner of a biblical judge than a Justice
forging new precedent. Her case-by-case approach means that, by
necessity, there is little "law" that flows from her decisions. There
is only what O'Connor thinks in that specific case. 12
Justice O'Connor's intellectual misadventure thus demonstrates that she
who lives by ad hocery dies by it. But, to be fair to Justice O'Connor, in
spite of her expansive language in Midkff she was right in protesting in her
Kelo dissent because her Midkiff opinion clearly and unequivocally
concluded that the condemnations in that case were justified by the
legislative intent to "attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property
ownership in Hawaii." ' 13 In the end, Justice O'Connor plainly endorsed the
traditional view that a purely private taking of land from A and giving it to B
"would serve no legitimate purpose of government" and would be a
violation of the "public use" clause." 4
In sum, to the extent they allowed condemnation of private property for
the use by private parties, both Berman and Midkiff were based on the idea
that the elimination of socially undesirable conditions through the use of
eminent domain was constitutionally permissible as a public benefit and as
such qualified as a "public use." Remarkably, in footnote 16 of its opinion,
the Kelo majority denied that the Court had held, as it plainly did in Berman
and Midkiff that it was the elimination of social harms, not the reuse of the
subject properties that justified the condemnations and met the "public
purpose" criterion." 5 This attempted denial of the obvious employed the
linguistic sleight-of-hand of asserting that the activities in Berman and
110. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674-75 (2005).
111. William D. Araiza et al., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697,717 (1997).
112. Dahlia Lithwick, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?-A Symposium, COMMENTARY,
Oct. 2003, at 40-4 1.
113. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
114. Id.
115. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666 n.16.
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Strickley (involving, respectively, an unblighted department store and a
mining operation) were not in themselves harmful.' 16 Of course they were
not. But that was a misreading of these two cases. What was found to be
the harm that condemnation sought to eliminate in Berman and Strickley
was, respectively, the obstacle to efficient area-wide slum clearance,'17 and
the barren, unproductive character of Utah land that, without the use of
eminent domain, would frustrate the public benefits flowing from expanded
mineral exploitation. 18  Remember that the Strickley Court viewed the
problem from a nineteenth century vantage point which saw intensive
exploitation of natural resources to build an expanding country as a great
public good." 9  Of course, whether these decisions were legally sound,
given the clear constitutional language requiring "public use" rather than
public prosperity and the like, is subject to debate. Yet there can be no
rational question that in these cases, the Kelo majority to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Court explicitly justified the takings on the basis of dire
necessity to eliminate public detriments-the Court's language can leave no
doubt on that score.'
20
And it was that justification of harm elimination through the use of
eminent domain that was jettisoned in Kelo, thus making it a blockbuster
case, the protestations of its fans notwithstanding. The Court's broad
interpretation that had mutated the "public use" clause into a "public
purpose" clause, was extended a step further so that it did not matter that
Susette Kelo's and her neighbors' land and homes, and the area in which
they were located, were well maintained and wholly unoffending. 2' Unlike
Berman where an unblighted property was included in the redevelopment
project area in order to permit area-wide elimination of a slum, there was
nothing justifying this approach in Kelo where there was no blight to begin
with that could possibly require elimination on an area-wide basis or
otherwise.
In Kelo, the City of New London was simply out to increase its cash
flow 122 and thought that its chosen redeveloper would be economically
successful, thus generating a trickle-down stream of money and other
116. Id.
117. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954).
118. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529, 531 (1906).
119. Id.
120. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
121. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664-65 ("Those who govern the City were not confronted with the
need to remove blight in the Fort Trumbull area .... ).
122. Though the city understandably made much of its problems caused by its declining
population, the closure of local military installations, and its resulting economic problems, the
Court's holding did not make such economic concerns a condition to the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Id. at 2665. Its holding allows even wealthy cities enjoying a surplus in public
funds to engage in this type of "economic redevelopment."
358
[Vol. 33: 335, 2006] Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff'?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
benefits to the community in the form of taxes and jobs.2 3 Such municipal
plans and hopes to reverse the long term decline of New London and to
facilitate the success of Pfizer's facility, said the Court, were sufficient.1
4
Henceforth, it would be enough to show that the taking is not arbitrary; i.e.,
that it is based on a municipal redevelopment plan arrived at after a study
that prognosticates future economic benefits. Of course, this is no standard
at all. Every business, whether privately established or municipally
sponsored, whether successful or not, begins operations on the basis of some
sort of envisioned plan that the entrepreneur believes will succeed.
Otherwise he or she would not go into that business at that time and place.
It is hard to imagine municipal planning apparatus functionaries so stupid
that they could not string together and recite by rote the boilerplate words
asserting a rosy economic vision of the future. 125  Such a vision, being
essentially a prognostication of future profits anticipated to be generated by
the proposed redevelopment, 26 and barring some obvious, colossal blunders
on the part of the project's promoters, is inherently incapable of empirical
refutation without the benefit of hindsight, or without the municipal
functionaries candidly disclosing their improper purpose-an event unlikely
to occur. Ironically, the courts' usual reason for denying compensation for
business losses in eminent domain is that business is so "uncertain in its
vicissitudes" that it cannot be reliably valued, 12 not even when the business
has been successfully operating for years. Yet in redevelopment cases,
courts blandly accept the condemnor's prognostications about future
financial benefits of conjectured businesses that have not even been
established.1 28 Though I claim no expertise in securities law, it seems plain
to me that were private entrepreneurs to sell stock in their corporation on the
basis of a business plan projection resting merely on what is rationally
related to the conceivable, they would in short order find themselves charged
with securities fraud.
123. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
124. Id. at 2658-59 (stating that "their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.").
125. "Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy's as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision
anyone but the 'stupid staffer' failing it." Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 n.12 (1992)).
126. Ironically, in eminent domain valuation litigation, prognostications of future profits are
inadmissible and the courts readily concede their lack of competence to assess future profits. See,
e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of
reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform."). The same is true of a
property owner's business plans and profit projections. See id.
127. Sawyer v. Commonwealth, 65 N.E. 52, 53 (Mass. 1902).
128. See Gideon Kanner, Wat to Do Until the Bulldozers Come?: Precondemnation Planning for
Landowners, 27 REAL ESTATE L.J. 47, 54 & n.21 (1998).
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The simple fact is that, under Kelo, municipal determinations of public
use are subject to a strong judicial presumption of regularity which in most
such cases would trump the condemnee's arguments on the grounds that
courts are not to second-guess legislative determinations. It would take a
courageous judge to reject these presumptions and accept instead the
condemnee's equally crystal-ball-gazing contrary conclusion. Moreover, a
municipal finding of necessity and feasibility of the project for which land is
being taken is not subject to any judicial review in federal courts, and in
most states only to what I like to call subminimal judicial review. Thus, the
reference to municipal plans and studies in the Kelo majority opinion as
justifying the municipal decision to condemn erects an all-but-
insurmountable evidentiary barrier for the condemnee and de facto reduces
the constitutional "public use" mandate to "hortatory fluff' as Justice
O'Connor stated. 129
VI. ILLUSORY REMEDY
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy made a grandstand gesture
by asserting that "[a] court confronted with a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a
serious one and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the
presumption that the government's actions were reasonable and intended to
serve a public purpose."'' 30  The problem with this formulation is that the
Court (with Justice Kennedy's concurrence) had already rejected the
argument that condemnations of this type should be subject to higher level
scrutiny than the current minimal-scrutiny, anything-goes approach that
merely looks to what is "rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,"
to use Justice O'Connor's Midkiff line again.' 3' One is thus at a loss to
understand how one could satisfy Justice Kennedy's criteria without
colliding with the no-heightened-level-of-review standard laid down by the
majority. Just how "the record" could possibly establish "undetected
impermissible favoritism"' 132 is obscure.
The majority likewise offered an ineffective remedy by suggesting that
undefined municipal "aberrations"' 133 are to be viewed with "a skeptical
129. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
131. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). Justice O'Connor qualified this
expansive phrase with a clear statement that purely private takings from A for B would remain
illegal. Id. at 245. Kelo, however, contains no such limitation.
132. 125 S. Ct. at 2670 (emphasis added).
133. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.17. The Court's use of the word "aberrations" in this context
suggests that the Justices are unacquainted with prevailing municipal practices and local land-use
politics. Sweetheart municipal deals with favored redevelopers are not occasional "aberrations," but
rather commonplace events-often the mother's milk of municipal politics and a staple of
redevelopment which operates on the [often untrue] assumption that redevelopers won't build in
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eye,' 34 citing 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
which enjoined the condemnation of premises occupied by a 99 Cents Only
store that the city sought to condemn in order to turn it over to Costco for
enlargement of its existing adjacent store. 1 The 99 Cents Only court
rejected the condemning agency's arguments that an enlarged Costco store
would generate more tax revenues than the competing 99 Cents Only store,
and that absent the condemnation, Costco would move elsewhere (as it
threatened to do), taking its cash flow with it.' 36 The redevelopment agency
in 99 Cents Only was so confident of its litigational prospects that it
inadvertently gave the game away by characterizing itself as a mere pawn in
the hands of Costco, the proverbial 800-pound gorilla that could have its
way with them and with the owners of the 99 Cents Only store. 3 7 These
arguments, far from bolstering its case, only raised questions as to
Lancaster's bona fides'-whether it was acting as a government entity
pursuing the public interest or merely as an errand boy for Costco's private,
profit-making ambitions.
"blighted" areas and therefore must be enticed to do so with land that is either free or offered to them
at prices substantially below the cost of municipal acquisition-a process known as "land
writedown."
134. Id. A "skeptical eye"? What level of scrutiny is that? It would certainly appear to be some
sort of heightened scrutiny that the Court explicitly refused to adopt. How then does one satisfy a
court that the skepticism is justified? And what kind and what quantum of evidence would be
needed to overcome the strong presumption that the condemnor's conduct is proper?
One is also entitled to ask why a reasonable, fair-minded person would not employ such a
"skeptical eye" in viewing the fact that NLDC's president (widely credited with persuading Pfizer to
put its research headquarters next to the project site and to collaborate with the city, see supra notes
25-27 and accompanying text) was married to a Pfizer executive at the time the decision to proceed
with the redevelopment was made. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. If that alone is not
worthy of a penetrating gaze by that "skeptical eye," then what is?
135. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
136. Id. at 1130.
137. Id. at 1129.
138. For example, the agreement between Lancaster, 99 Cents Only's landlord, and Costco had
been negotiated in secret and was revealed to 99 Cents Only after it was a "done deal" whereby,
inter alia, Lancaster "would return to Costco any sales taxes beyond a $350,000 annual benchmark,"
and would "reimburse Costco for its $4.5 million cost of expansion." Christopher Woodard,
Lancaster Snubs Smaller Retailer in Favor of Costco, L.A. BUS. J., Mar. 6, 2000, at 11. Also,
Costco unblushingly played the role of the 800-pound gorilla, as a Lancaster functionary put it, by
threatening to shut down its store and leave it empty (thus depriving Lancaster of any revenues from
these premises), unless it got its way with its rival 99 Cents Only store. Brief of Appellee at 1, 3, 99
Cents Only Stores, Inc., v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 60 F. App'x 123 (9th Cir. 2003) (No.
01-56338), WL 32120350. Lancaster argued that appeasing Costco's demands was the "public use"
justifying its attempted condemnation of the 99 Cents Only premises. 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F.
Supp. 2d at 1129. The Judge presiding over the 99 Cents Only case was, to put it mildly,
unpersuaded. Id. at 1131.
On a doctrinal level, Justice Kennedy's suggestion confuses public use
with public necessity. His rose-colored view of the process of challenging
unwholesome condemnations is at best naive because it is unlikely that
future condemnors in cases of this type would repeat Lancaster's and
Costco's error of disclosing their improper purpose. Also, the strong
presumption of permissible conduct on the condemnor's part, even before
Kelo, usually motivates trial judges to see no evil, hear no evil, and speak no
evil in such cases, even when they fail the "smell test." In any event, Justice
Kennedy confused the issue of how a project is being implemented with the
question of whether the project can qualify as public to begin with,
irrespective of the mode of its implementation.
More important, neither the majority nor the Kennedy concurrence
indicate what admissible evidence would be probative of such illicit motive,
how it could be obtained, and how it would transform the vision of that
"skeptical eye" into judicial relief. Justice Kennedy's opinion thus inspired
Justice O'Connor's apt response that he prescribed a "careful review of the
record and the process by which a legislature arrived at the decision to
take-without specifying what courts should look for in a case with different
facts, how they will know if they have found it, and what to do if they do
not." '139 Confessions of municipal impropriety are unlikely to be volunteered
by the guilty parties, and the subjective motivation of municipal decision-
makers is not subject to discovery because it is deemed irrelevant. 140
Besides, once the government decision to proceed with a legislatively
authorized type of project that is within its powers is made, it does not
matter what the subjective motivation of the decision-makers may be in
choosing this or that redeveloper. 141 In other words, if the project is found to
satisfy the newly minted "public purpose" standard, the condemnation need
not be pursued by developers who are pure of heart. Boss Tweed would
have loved it.
In short, insofar as the nature of the project is concerned, why would it
matter whether the redeveloper was selected on the merits because of his
sterling performance on prior projects, or because he was the mayor's son-
in-law? After all, mayors' sons-in-law have to make a living too. As Justice
O'Connor pointed out, the fact that the government means to favor a chosen
private party has no bearing on whether that party's development activities
will generate area-wide economic benefits sufficient to sustain the taking
139. Kelo 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. See, e.g., Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (Ct. App. 1980).
141. See Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612, 618,
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 771 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to review on the merits the owners'
serious charges of impermissible favoritism, i.e., that the boundaries of the redevelopment project in
issue were corruptly drawn to confer illegitimate economic benefits on the Mayor's friends, on the
grounds that whatever the subjective motivation in choosing the redeveloper, the project was still for
redevelopment, a public use, and as such not subject to judicial interdiction).
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were it done by a developer untainted by a relationship with the city
fathers. 42 In the words of the Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. court: "To the
extent that the [condemnees] can prove favoritism in the selection of one
development over another, there may be a violation of state law,
necessitating a new selection [of a redeveloper], but this does not go to [the
condemnees'] constitutional claim.' ' 143  To be sure, "impermissible
favoritism" in the conduct of municipal affairs may well cause the dramatis
personae to find themselves in legal trouble (particularly where
consideration changed hands in the process of developer selection), but
insofar as the substantive law of eminent domain law is concerned, that
would be a matter at most raising but not resolving issues going to
necessity.' 44 In other words, the purity vel non of the redeveloper-city
relationship would not make the "public project" any less or more public. 145
If Justice Kennedy disagreed and meant to disapprove the reasoning of
Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc., he certainly could have said so. But he did not.
What all this suggests is that Justice Kennedy had not thought this problem
through, that, being a decent person, he was troubled by the result reached
by the court, and that he felt the need to say something to assuage his
feelings and create at least an illusion of potentially available relief. But it
also suggests that he is uninformed on the subject of eminent domain law
and even less so on the subject of municipal practices in its use. This is
understandable, given the Justices' backgrounds and the Court's current
workload. 146 With so few eminent domain cases being considered on the
142. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc., 605 F. Supp. at 618. Actually, this statement evaded the
condemnees' argument. They argued not only that there was favoritism in choosing the redeveloper,
but also that the project boundaries were corruptly drawn to encompass their property for the favored
redevelopers' use. Id. at 616-17.
144. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.270 (West 1982) (even where it is found that a
resolution of necessity has been procured by bribery, the resolution is not vitiated but only rendered
rebuttable).
145. Thus, it is not uncommon that highways and power transmission lines are built that serve
only one private tract of land. See, e.g., William J. Eaton, Costly Road Aiding Steel Firm Assailed,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1970, Part I, at 4 (thirteen-mile interstate highway spur built at a cost of $47.1
million to serve only one property-a Jones & Laughlin steel plant-to keep a promise made to its
owner by the state, in exchange for Jones & Laughlin's promise to locate its plant in Illinois); see
also 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 7.07[4][a][iv] (Julius L. Sackman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005).
146. In the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court has considered, on the merits, only three
eminent domain cases that gave rise to issues involving the condemnor's right to take (not including
Kelo)-hardly a sufficient case load to maintain the Court's level of doctrinal expertise and beyond
that, a minimally sophisticated understanding of how the eminent domain law is administered and
how it impacts on those affected by it.
This is a generic problem, not necessarily confined to eminent domain. As aptly observed by
Stuart Taylor Jr., "[t]he Supreme Court's greatest failing is not ideological bias-it's the justices'
increasingly tenuous grasp of how the real world works." Stuart Taylor Jr., Remote Control,
363
merits, it is not surprising that this field of law is unfamiliar to the Justices
and their clerks. 147 But whatever it is that Justice Kennedy wanted to say, he
would have been well advised to spell out exactly what his doctrinal
reasoning was. A call for supplemental briefing of this point would not have
been amiss either.
148
Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion, evidently developed
concerns over the vigorous, negative public reaction to his handiwork, and
responded to the public outcry that greeted Kelo. In an unprecedented move,
Justice Stevens proceeded to justify himself in public at a meeting of the
Clark County (Las Vegas) Bar Association. 149 There, he explained that he
ruled for New London under compulsion of law, in spite of his individual
belief that this "the allocation of economic resources that result from the free
play of market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long
run than the best-intentioned plans of politicians," because the New London
project "fit the definition of 'public use." '150  But as shown above, the
Constitutional text permits no such thing, 151 and neither did the Court's pre-
Kelo decisional law. In fact, the Kelo majority did not follow established
precedent. Rather, the Court created a new rule that removed the restriction
that allowed immediate reconveyance of the taken land to private parties for
economic profit only when doing so eliminated a serious public detriment-
something that was concededly not involved in Kelo. Justice Stevens' self-
conscious protestation notwithstanding, his opinion vastly expanded the
contours of permissible exercise of the power of eminent domain, and if he
was sincere in believing otherwise, that would only suggest that he too may
not have been fully informed.
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 37. See also Benjamin Wittes, Without Precedent, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, 39 ("the Supreme Court's problem is not merely disconnection from the real
world-it's also arrogance, dishonesty, grandiosity, and lack of respect for principle, history, or
logic."); See also Paul Bator, What Is Wrong With the Supreme Court? 51 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 673
(1990) (arguing that "the Court is in deep institutional trouble.").
147. Between 1974 and 1992, I taught what at the time was the only regular course on eminent
domain law offered annually at an American law school by a full-time faculty member. When I say
"eminent domain law," I mean a nuts-and-bolts course on condemnation, including procedure and
valuation, as well as the right to take, not just an occasional seminar on regulatory takings, or the
nodding acquaintance with the subject of takings provided by Property or Constitutional Law
courses. I learned in the process that there are no legal texts on the subject suitable for use by
novices at the law school level. Moreover, it was my observation that upper-crust law students who
become law review editors, and thus a part of the population from which courts draw their clerks,
rarely if ever take specialized land-use (and in my case, eminent domain) courses-those being
"deemed too 'practical' and too local in scope for budding legal scholars." Gideon Kanner, Hunting
the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate
Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 339 (1998).
148. This sort of judicial performance is hardly unprecedented. See Kanner, Hunting the Snark,
supra note 147, at 339-41, 343-45 (commenting on other instances of the Court's misunderstanding
of pertinent land-use law and practices, even when they appeared plainly in the record).
149. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Stevens' speech.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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VII. So WHAT Do WE Do NOW?
What are we to make of all this? At the moment, the Court's laissez
faire attitude appears to have opened the door wider to abusive and corrupt
uses of the eminent domain power'52 with the full ramifications of its impact
yet to be determined. But for those with even a modicum of understanding
of how eminent domain actually works in application, and how municipal
functionaries in charge of land acquisition operate, the handwriting is on the
wall. The ability of the redevelopment process to enrich well-connected
redevelopers who use it for their own benefit at both public and private
expense, legitimizing in the process a form of municipal kleptocracy, to
borrow an apt term from the Wall Street Journal, appears likely. 5 3  The
judicial definition of "public use," as that term is used in the Fifth
Amendment, has now been pushed to a reductio ad absurdum extent, so that
it is now difficult to visualize any proposed private, profit-making use that
could not be squeezed into Kelo's brave, new "public purpose" standard.
Promoters of any use can now simply prognosticate economic benefits to the
community even as they go about stuffing their own pockets, and argue, not
that what they have in mind will be successful as judged by sound business
standards, but merely by what is "rationally related to the conceivable." The
obvious problem with this approach is that once the redevelopers' optimistic
prognostications are accepted by congenial municipal functionaries, the
latter's determination is not subject to any review worthy of the name, even
when it is plainly wrong. 154
Kelo's promise, in effect, is that any property may be forcibly taken for
any purpose deemed by redevelopers to be more lucrative than the existing
one. This raises more serious concerns apart from the obvious one of
encouragement of corruption and overreaching in city government. If the
new, municipally-favored Robber Barons become emboldened by the
money-making vistas opened up by Kelo's promise, this will sooner or later
152. See John Kass, High Court Ruling Steamrolls Rights of the Little Guy, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 26,
2005, at C2 (characterizing the post-Kelo regime as "The Chicago Way-in which business and real
estate become dependent on politics and favors .... Developers cozy up to politicians, unions cozy
up to developers, zoning lawyers take their orders, the political boss gives his OK, and everybody
eats."). See also Bill Boyarsky, Another Look at Subsidies for Redevelopment, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1992, at B2 ("[R]edevelopment means campaign contributions to city council members. The land
developers and attorneys involved in redevelopment deals are big donors. Wipe out redevelopment
and you eliminate a big source of campaign dollars.").
153. Editorial, Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at A26.
154. For an egregious example, see Robert Moses' brazen "finding" that a perfectly fine
Manhattan area containing only 2% slums and 10% substandard tenements was "blighted" so as to
justify its destruction in toto to provide a site for the New York Coliseum-a finding void of
meaningful judicial review. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 23-24.
inspire violence on the part of angry people being driven without full
indemnity from their increasingly irreplaceable homes for the sake of
facilitating private money-making schemes of wealthy, municipally well-
connected developers. Perhaps the sense of human territoriality has been
dissipated by decades of soft living in America to such an extent that
recourse to violence will not occur. Then again, who knows? 55 One hopes
the ongoing adverse popular reaction to Kelo will be only political. But then
again, when the 1954 Berman decision gave rise to the "Negro removal"
problem'5 6 discussed post, no one thought that a scant ten years later
American cities would erupt into large-scale riots by a put-upon minority
population venting the resentment it felt-rightly or wrongly-over its
treatment, including the mass displacements by redevelopment projects. 57
We would do well to keep in mind Justice Holmes' admonition that
"[p]roperty is protected because such protection answers a demand of human
nature, and therefore takes the place of a fight."'
158
The legal battle line over improper private takings has now shifted to the
state legislatures and state courts. States are free to grant their citizens
greater rights than the minimal ones enshrined in the U.S. Constitution-a
principle that is applicable to eminent domain. 59
155. See Michael M. Berger, To Regulate or Not To Regulate-Is that the Question? Reflections
on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 253, 265-67 (1975) (stressing the prevailing understanding of human territoriality and
the risk of violence when private rights in land are insecure).
156. See, e.g., Starr v. Nashville Hous. Auth., 145 F. Supp. 498, 499 (M.D. Tenn. 1956), affid,
354 U.S. 916 (1957) (directing a highway through a black-owned business area and theater).
157. See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 339 (collecting citations to source materials
dealing with incidents of violence that followed redevelopment, notably the widespread urban riots
of the 1960s).
158. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904). See Michael. M. Berger, People Are Mad As Hell
About Use of Eminent Domain, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 1, 2005, at 6. Though large scale violent
opposition to proposed takings have mostly taken place in foreign countries like Japan and Mexico,
id., the phenomenon of violent reaction to condemnations is hardly unknown here in the United
States. Consider the "battle of Chavez Ravine," where a physical confrontation erupted between
inhabitants of a Mexican area of Los Angeles while protesting their displacement from their homes
in order to make room for Dodger Stadium. Lawrence J. McQuillan and Lydia D. Ortega, When
Redevelopment Means Razing the Homes of the Poor, L.A. Bus. J., Aug. 1, 2005, at 39; see also
T.W. McGarry, Postscript: 'My Grandchildren Go to the Games... The Dodgers Are My Favorite
Team. But I Just Can't Go in That Stadium', L.A. TIMES, Jul. 12, 1988, Part 2, at 3. There have also
been large-scale riots by Minnesota farmers protesting the takings of easements across their
farmland for high-voltage electrical power transmission lines. See Mary Losure, Powerline Blues,
MINNESOTA PUB. RADIO, Dec. 9, 2002, available at
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org./features/200212/O8-losurem-powerline/ (this site provides
links to numerous photographs of the melees between the Minnesota farmers and the police).
159. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923) (holding that states are free to
provide a higher level of condemnee rights than are available under the minimal constitutional
standards of compensability decreed by the U.S. Supreme Court). Several states have enhanced
condemnee rights with regard to the right to take, by imposing more stringent requirements for
meeting their state constitutional "public use" standards. See, e.g., Sw. I11. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l Envtl.
LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1 (I11. 2002); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004);
Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. App. 2003); Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586
366
[Vol. 33: 335, 2006] Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff"?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Finally, the majority ignored the serious concerns voiced by Justice
Thomas in the penultimate paragraph of his dissenting opinion in Kelo.
Justice Thomas was quite right in noting that the law of eminent domain has
never been the subject of a coherent doctrinal analysis by the Supreme
Court, and that such an analysis is well overdue.1 60  A host of legal
commentaries attest to the soundness of his conclusion. Moreover, it is
incontestable that the history of modem American urban redevelopment has
been one of discrimination against, and oppression of, politically powerless
urban ethnic and economic minorities. Historically, these affected people
have been abused and pushed out of their modest dwellings to make room
for upscale commercial facilities and luxury dwellings for the better-off
segments of society. 161
Southwest Washington D.C., the site of the Berman case, provides the
proverbial "Exhibit A" for such concerns.162 There, the largely poor, black
residents were pushed out of their homes, into other District of Columbia
slums. 163 Thus, the high-minded judicial prose in the Berman opinion,
deploring the unfortunate slum dwellers' lot in life and calling for its
improvement through redevelopment, 64 proved to be a cruel farce. Far from
providing replacement housing for the poor at a $17 per month per room
rent, as falsely represented to the Supreme Court, 165 Southwest Washington
was redeveloped into upscale commercial facilities, co-ops, townhouses, and
apartments charging rents that were so high that within a few years they
inspired a rent strike by affluent tenants.
166
S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 2003); Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. 1998)
(all forbidding condemnations for private commercial uses under the guise of redevelopment).
160. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2682-84 (2005). Over the years, scholarly
commentaries have been overflowing with criticisms of judicial handiwork in the area of eminent
domain law, ranging from polite to acerbic, all agreeing that the decisional law of eminent domain
is, to put it mildly, a wretched, inconsistent, and at times incoherent mess. For a tidy collection of
citations to such scholarly invective, see Jerrold A. Fadem, Trial Tactics to Make the Compensation
Just to the Owner, in 1973 INST. ON PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 261 (Virginia Shook
Randall ed., Matthew Bender & Co.).
161. See Terry J. Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on
Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 227 (1968) (noting that "[u]pper-and
middle-income groups have been able to take advantage of the subsidy involved in urban renewal to
displace the poor, who in turn receive no subsidy for their housing.").
162. See the penultimate paragraph of Justice Thomas' dissent, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687.
163. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
164. Id. at 32-33.
165. See id. at 30-31.
166. Joann Lublin, Tenants' Revolt Hits A Luxury High-Rise; Target Is the FHA, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 13, 1969, at 10. There are many critical commentaries on the abuse of eminent domain in
redevelopment. For a sampling, see Michael R. Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the
Human Disruption, 46 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1968); Daniel R. Mandelker, Public Purpose in Eminent
Domain, 28 TUL. L. REV. 96, 108 n.45 (1954); Henry W. McGee, Jr., Urban Renewal in the
The characterization of urban renewal as "Negro removal" was coined
in the 1960s 167 and has been used since then to refer to this sort of urban
"ethnic cleansing., 168  Additionally, this phrase has not been limited to use
in redevelopment cases. Comedian Dick Gregory hit the rhetorical bull's
eye with his bon mot "Urban renewal is Negro removal, but in California we
call it freeways." 169  One of the most revealing bits of pertinent history
illustrating Gregory's insight is the speech, breathtaking in its candid
disclosure of the racist animus behind the process of urban condemnation,
given by U.S. District Judge Miles Lord, to a gathering of U.S. Attorneys, in
which he reminisced about the old days when he and his colleagues
went through the black section between Minneapolis and St.
Paul... about four blocks wide and we took out the home of every
black man in that city. And woman and child .... Nice little neat
black neighborhood, you know, with their churches and all and we
Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REV. 826 (1970); Charles Martin Sevilla, Asphalt Through
the Model Cities: A Study of Highways and the Urban Poor, 49 U. DET. J. URB. L. 297 (1971); Terry
J. Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement of Conditions on Federal Grants to
Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 183, 227 (1968). With particular reference to the systematic,
gross undercompensation of condemnees who were routinely offered supposed compensation that
was in fact less than the condemnor's own appraisal reports, see Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan,
The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look Into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 430 (1967), concluding that statistics collected by the authors with collaboration of the county
"convey explicit rebuke to a system which took advantage of nearly everyone, but saved the greatest
hardships for those-the docile, duressed, uncounselled-most entitled to solicitousness." Id. at
457. See also Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policy: Hearings on H.R. 386
AND Related Bills Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong. 1-615 (1968); Real Property
Acquisition Practices and Adequacy of Compensation in Federal and Federally Assisted Programs:
Hearings before the Select Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisition of the H, Comm. on Public
Works, 88th Cong. (1963).
Though formal studies of this type are hard to come by these days, there is a realistic basis
for concluding that the practice of making lowball offers for land sought to be acquired by eminent
domain continues. This is attested to by the fact that condemnation lawyers typically charge
condemnees a fraction of their recovery over and above the condemnor's offer, and they do well.
See Ray Rivera, UDOT: Fair Deals or Land Grabs?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 24, 1999, at Al
(reporting that eight out of every ten Utah condemnees who refused UDOT's offers and litigated
their just compensation, recovered more money, with a median increase in compensation of 41 %
over the offer).
167. Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966, 967 n.7
(1968); McGee, supra note 166, at 859-60 n.146.
168. Judy Pasternak, Is It Urban Renewal or Removal?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at Al
(reporting the filing of a class action by the U.S. Department of Justice-one of four such lawsuits
against municipalities-this one against the Village of Addison, Illinois-charging it with the
misuse of its blight elimination process by focusing its property acquisition efforts on parts of town
with a Mexican population, and displacing it in the process).
169. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 45 (describing how in Los Angeles, no less than five
freeways were routed through the largely Mexican Boyle Heights area). See also James W. Follin,
Coordination of Urban Renewal With the Urban Highway Program Offers Major Economies in Cost
and Time, URB. LAND, Dec. 1956, at 3-6 (explaining the correspondence of "urban renewal" and the
"urban highway program"); Gary T. Schwartz, Urban Freeways and the Interstate System, 49 S.
CAL. L. REV. 406, 484-85 (1976) (stating that "[i]t is also true that in the 1955 designations a
disproportionate number of Interstates were routed through low-income neighborhoods.").
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gave them about $6,000 a house and turned them loose onto
society.' "
Fort Worth City Attorney S. G. Johndroe, Jr., delivered the same
message. His words may have been not so blunt but the tune was familiar:
Quite frequently, if the city is involved in condemning some
property, most of the adjacent property consists of cheap,
substandard residential units-rental properties in the majority [of
cases]. A substantial number of these highways in the more
populous urban areas are constructed in locales for what might be
considered a dual purpose-highway purposes and, vicariously,
urban renewal purposes. There isn't anything wrong with that, and
it appears increasingly to become the rule rather than the
exception. 17
Such was the reality behind the Berman-style urban renewal process
which was widely misrepresented by the press to the country as "slum
clearance" assertedly intended to revitalize cities by eliminating the slum
inhabitants' wretched living conditions and replacing them with decent
dwellings. 172 But in reality, American cities declined, and those displaced
by redevelopment were subjected to a double whammy. As mostly month-
to-month tenants of modest means, they were routinely uncompensated or
undercompensated by hardnosed redevelopment functionaries, while losing
the only homes they had. 173 They were forced to incur the cost of relocation
into other blighted areas, which was all they could afford. Redevelopment
has historically been a net destroyer of affordable, middle and lower-middle
170. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 934, 953 (2003) (quoting FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 29); see also FRIEDEN &
SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 28 (deliberate routing of a highway in Nashville through the center of a
black community, a black college and sixteen blocks of largely black-owned businesses).
171. S. G. Johndroe, Jr., Effective Examination, 1968 8TH INST. ON EMINENT DOMAIN 79, 84-85
(Matthew Bender).
172. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 25, 30 (1954).
173. For a classic horror story that emerged from the Washington redevelopment project, see the
infamous Mame Riley case, Riley v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d
641 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the redevelopment agency took Ms. Riley's home (that included a
small rented apartment) but undercompensated her to such an extent that she wound up with no roof
over her head and no compensation, but still owing a substantial sum to her mortgagee. The court
found nothing wrong with that legally; its majority reversed on the factual grounds that the
condemning agency's appraiser made erroneous statements at trial as to the payoff rate of the
mortgage. Id. at 644-45. But Warren Burger, then a Judge on the D.C. Circuit, was willing to
overlook the tainted valuation testimony, and dissented, arguing that no relief whatever should be
provided to the unfortunate Ms. Riley. Id. at 649.
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urban class housing,'7 4 thus making the task of finding replacement
dwellings more difficult and more costly.
Now, a half-century later, in a climate of acute scarcity and high cost of
decent but affordable dwellings, current redevelopment practices that
destroy low and moderately priced housing represent extremely bad public
policy. They contribute to sprawl as the displaced population has no
alternative but to seek replacement housing elsewhere, which often means
having to move to the suburbs and thus contributing to the phenomenon of
declining city populations. This process is particularly unfortunate when
juxtaposed with state laws requiring that municipalities formulate general
plans containing housing elements that call for providing adequate,
affordable housing-a mandate honored in breach rather than in
obedience. 7 5 Thus, on the one hand, the government calls for affordable
housing construction, but on the other hand it destroys such existing housing
through the redevelopment process.
California statutes, for example, require redevelopment agencies to
spend 20% of their budgets on housing to replace the housing destroyed in
the process of redevelopment. 17 6  But only a fraction of this amount is
actually spent on housing, and of that 12% is spent on administrative
overhead.'77 It is unsurprising that this is the case because there is no
enforcement apparatus to enforce these provisions of the law.
In short, redevelopment has historically provided downtown business
interests with new office buildings at a lower cost than what they would
have to pay otherwise, and it has cheapened mall construction for mass
merchandisers. But otherwise it is to curing modern urban ills and the
decline of cities what bleeding the patient was to seventeenth century
medicine. Ever since the end of World War II, it has been relentless
government policy to induce, encourage, and subsidize urban populations to
leave cities and move to the suburbs where life has been generally more
agreeable and housing opportunities have been consistently better, more
affordable, and in the long run more lucrative to home owners. Pretending
174. See Charles W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief 57 VA. L. REV. 745,
745-46 (1971) (noting that between 1950 and 1968, 2.38 million housing units were destroyed by
redevelopment). By the mid-1960s, some 111,000 families and 17,800 businesses were being
displaced by eminent domain annually. A COMMISSION REPORT, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL
TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND BustNESS DISPLACED BY GOVERNMENTS, ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 11-13 (1965); see also Mandelker, supra note 166, at 108 n.45
(collecting materials attesting to the massive failure of condemning entities to provide adequate
substitute housing for the persons displaced by redevelopment). As a California Court of Appeal
observed, "relocation is the weak link" of redevelopment. Gonzales v. City of Santa Ana, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 132, 139 (1993).
175. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65302(c), 65580-81 (West 1997); see also Michael M. Berger, So Far,
State's Housing Plan Has Been All Yak, No Shack, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 2, 2005, at 6.
176. MORR Report, supra note 38, at 26.
177. Id. ("Despite the 20% [affordable housing] requirement, the 2002-2003 State Controller's
Report summary (page 253) shows barely 3% was spent on low and moderate income housing.").
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that the subsidized construction of a few structures-such as downtown
office buildings, shopping malls (a favorite redevelopment use), automobile
manufacturing facilities, car dealerships, and even gambling casinos-will
revitalize American cities whose population has fled (and still is fleeing) to
the suburbs, is at best an exercise in irrational futility and at worst an
unabashed raid on the public treasury that bears no relation to the high-
minded justifications for the use of eminent domain in the redevelopment
process.
It must be stressed that these days redevelopment usually has nothing to
do with "slum clearance." That is so because the population living in or near
slum or genuinely blighted areas is poor and therefore incapable of
patronizing and supporting the upscale stores and other commercial facilities
that are usually built on redevelopment sites.'78 Thus, today's would-be
redevelopers won't consider genuinely blighted parts of town, but rather
what has been aptly termed "blight that's right"-i.e., parts of town that are
sufficiently downscale to support a colorable claim of being "blighted," but
good enough for commercial redevelopment that will attract free-spending
customers to the new businesses built on the redeveloped land.
179
As for the visions of a more affluent municipal tomorrow generated by
redevelopment revenues, the process is hardly beer and skittles. As a matter
of common sense, in spite of the municipal government's participation in the
forcible acquisition of land for redevelopment, and its acting as friendly
financier for the redevelopers, redevelopment is no more than development
with the prefix "re" attached to it. It is an entrepreneurial activity that like
all other such activities carries with it the risk of failure, 8° thereby leaving
178. Associated Press, Wrecking Ball to Launch Big Philadelphia Face Lift, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2002, at A24 ("In some neighborhoods, empty buildings stretch for blocks. Even in Center City-the
downtown area that is home to the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall, as well as thriving
restaurants-sit near-vacant and decaying townhouses."). Though of late there has begun a trickle of
persons returning to cities which are responding by providing new housing opportunities in the form
of apartments, see Daniel Yi, Home Builders Looking Inward, L.A. TIMES, May, 24, 2005, at B1,
this urban influx tends to consist of empty nesters and young singles, thus leaving open the question
whether this trend will result in the revival of cities as a habitat for middle class families that are the
backbone of successful urban societies. See Joel Kotkin, Hip Lofisters Will Stay Lonely, for Suburbs
Still Seduce, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at Ml.
179. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 18, at 23; see also George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight
That's Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1003-04 (2001).
180. Redevelopment projects have failed in Yonkers, N.Y., Manhattan (the abortive New York
Stock Exchange caper that cost the city $109 million with nothing to show for it), California
(redevelopment projects failed in Fresno, North Hollywood, Redondo Beach, Hawthorne, and
Pasadena), and Minneapolis, Johnson v. Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. 2003). See generally
Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY. BILL RTS. J. 653, 687 n.142 (2005). For
examples of other condemnations that wasted fortunes and failed to achieve their announced
the municipal taxpayers holding the bag when a project fails'' while the
local city hall movers and shakers go on to promote some other dubious
scheme in an effort to provide the city with something for nothing-i.e., a
new source of funds without the need to confront the electorate and raise
taxes as may be necessary for proper municipal operations. Municipal
functionaries are usually something less than virtuosi when it comes to
profit-making land development deals, so it is not surprising that
redevelopment deals usually favor the redevelopers at public expense, and
that redevelopment has a history of delays, cost overruns, and failures.
Of course, one cannot very well ask the courts to involve themselves in
the supervision of such activities to assure sound business practices by
municipalities. Judges are no more inclined and qualified to do so than other
government actors. But it is troubling to see the courts blithely or even
enthusiastically encouraging the various reckless redevelopment schemes
without any indication of awareness by judges that they are facilitating a
risky and economically predatory process that not only harms the
condemnees who are often viewed from the bench as second-class citizens,
but also puts the taxpayers' interests into serious jeopardy. 182 It need not be
that way. In risky enterprises the risk should be borne by the parties who
stand to benefit from the redevelopment enterprise, 183 not by the public, and
certainly not by the victims of the process who-adding insult to injury in
the case of displaced businesses-are told by the courts that their business
losses are entirely noncompensable. 114 For a refreshing judicial departure
from the prevailing see-no-evil, etc. judicial complacency in dealing with
redevelopment, see Regus v. City of Baldwin Park,5 ' containing an astute
judicial assessment of the usual redevelopment process, authored by
California Court of Appeal Associate Justice Macklin Fleming, which bears
repeating:
[U]nrestricted use of redevelopment powers fosters speculative
competition between municipalities in their attempts to attract
private enterprise, speculation which they can finance in part with
purposes, see id. at 763, n.450, and Gideon Kanner, What to Do Until the Bulldozers Come?-
Precondemnation Planning for Landowners, 27 REAL EST. L. J. 47, 54 nn.21 & 22 (1998).
181. Compare Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975) with Yonkers
v. Otis Elevator Co., 844 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (city condemned land for expansion of the Otis
plant, but later Otis shut down the plant and left town, leaving the city holding the bag). For other
instances of costly redevelopment and other public project failures, see, e.g., Kanner, Making Laws
and Sausages, supra note 180, at 693 n.165, 763 n.450.
182. Thus, in California the bonded indebtedness run up by redevelopment agencies has soared
from $5 billion in 1995 to $56 billion in 2003. MORR Report, supra note 38, at 12.
183. "He who takes the benefit must bear the burden." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3521 (West 1997).
184. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 922 (Cal. 1977); but see CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1253.510 (1982) (enacted in 1976 on recommendation of the California Law
Revision Commission to abrogate the unjust and defective judge-made noncompensability rule).
185. 139 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1977).
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other people's money. When the extraordinary powers of
legislation designed to combat blight and renew decayed urban
areas are used as a fiscal device to promote industrial, commercial,
and business development in a project area that is merely
underdeveloped rather than blighted, competitive speculation may
be turned loose. By misemploying the extraordinary powers of
urban renewal a redevelopment agency captures pending tax
revenues which it can then use as a grubstake to subsidize
commercial development within the project area in the hope of
striking it rich. Such schemes contemplate borrowing money by
issuing bonds on the strength of assured future tax revenues, money
which is then used to acquire, improve, and resell property within
the project area at a loss as an inducement to business enterprises
such as K-Mart to locate within the project area rather than in
neighboring communities. In essence, tax revenues are used as
subsidies to attract new business. The immediate gainers are the
subsidized businesses. The immediate losers are the taxpayers and
government entities outside the project area, who are required to
pay the normal running expenses of government operation without
the assistance of new tax revenues from the project area.
The promoters of such projects promise that in time everyone will
benefit, taxpayers, government entities, other property owners,
bondholders; all will profit from increased development of property
and increased future assessments on the tax rolls, for with the
baking of a bigger pie bigger shares will come to all. But the
landscape is littered with speculative real estate developments
whose profits turned into pie in the sky; particularly where a
number of communities have competed with one another to attract
the same regional businesses. Undoubtedly, it was for these reasons
that the Legislature restricted urban renewal to blighted areas, and,
when faced with abuses in 1976, further tightened its restrictions.
At bench, City's projected redevelopment plan possesses a
particularly speculative cast in that the businesses it hopes to attract
through redevelopment are primarily those of consumption rather
than production, businesses such as hotels and shopping centers
whose acquisition does not increase the total wealth of a region as a
whole but merely redistributes the existing supply by capturing
business from rival communities. The success of such strategy
assumes the absence of effective counter-measures by rival
communities targeted for displacement. Private enterprises may
embark on such speculative competitive enterprises. Under present
laws, public entities may not. 186
As suggested by Justice Fleming, redevelopment can be a zero-sum
game. To the extent municipality A is able to execute a redevelopment plan
and construct shopping malls, and the like, adjacent municipality B, or other
nearby areas, cannot construct similar facilities since a single region has
only so many consumers with so many discretionary dollars to spend. This
process thus effectively captures government power to limit the business
potential for competing facilities.
The Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, 87 adopted by Congress in
1970 as a reaction to numerous horror stories of mass undercompensation
and other abuses of American condemnees, 8 8 curbed some of the worst
abuses, but on the whole proved to be pretty much a "toothless tiger"
because of the limited scope of its benefits and its prohibition on
condemnees' lawsuits seeking its enforcement. 89 Thus, de facto, the Act
makes condemnees dependent on a particular condemnor's good faith in
providing benefits under it. Some states follow the Act's provisions only
when federal funds are used for a particular project, leaving their citizens
whose property is taken for other projects in the same unfortunate condition
that existed before the passage of the Act.190
The basic problem of undercompensation has also defied solution
because of the economics of litigation. Unless the "spread" between the
condemnor's and condemnees' appraisals is large enough to make litigation
worthwhile, small condemnees-people like Suzette Kelo and her
neighbors-have no realistic recourse to the judicial valuation process
because (absent the unlikely appearance on the scene of a pro bono "angel")
the cost of appraisals and litigation is likely to consume all or most of the
recovery above the condemnor's offer. Therefore it is not surprising that in
the vast majority of cases the targeted condemnees in downscale parts of
town feel compelled to accept the government offers, concluding bitterly
that "you can't fight city hall."
186. Id. at982-83.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4501-55 (2000).
188. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policy: Hearings on H.R. 386
AND Related Bills Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong. 1-615 (1968).
189. Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages, supra note 180, at 686. See generally Catherine R.
Lazuran, Annotation: Uniform Relocation: Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970, 33 A.L.R. FED. 9 (1977) (analyzing case law construing the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970).
190. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel
Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 333, 347-47 (1984) (discussing how the courts' narrow
interpretation of the URA has resulted in governmental "buck-passing").
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Justice O'Connor also deserves credit for taking note in her Kelo dissent
of the reality that lucrative Kelo-like sweetheart deals'9' are not likely to be
casually handed out by municipal politicians to total strangers.' 92 More
likely, their beneficiaries will be individuals who are politically and
economically well connected with the local political structure, 93 who thus
stand to become the new Robber Barons, not unlike the nineteenth century
railroad tycoons who amassed fortunes while their companies abused the
condemnation process with judicial acquiescence' 94 It is obvious that today
an unwholesomely close relationship exists between municipal officials and
land-use functionaries on the one hand, and large redevelopers on the other.
Morally speaking, municipal politics is frequently the basement, if not the
sewer, of American politics, so the potential for municipal corruption is now
greatly increased, without any meaningful checks on such abuses.
While all this admittedly goes to the wisdom of policies pursued by
municipalities, and thus in theory would seem to involve matters that the
courts should not be concerned with, there is still a legitimate question for
the courts. Namely, the courts need to determine whether these speculative
public-private ventures deserve being treated as presumptively valid, or
whether, as Justice Kennedy suggests in his concurrence, some of these
situations require a more skeptical standard of review aimed at determining
whether these activities are indeed "public use" or merely camouflage for
private enrichment at public cost.' 95
VIII. LAW OR POLICY?
On August 18, 2005, Justice Stevens made a remarkable speech to the
Clark County (Las Vegas) Bar Association, in which he discussed several
191. The redeveloper chosen in Kelo was negotiating a contract to get exclusive possession and
control of a 90-acre waterfront parcel, on a 99-year lease, with rent payable at $1 per year. Kelo v.
City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 n.4 (2005). Sweetheart deals like that are common.
Indeed, the linchpin of redevelopment is the resale of the taken and cleared land to redevelopers for
less than the municipal cost of acquisition. See generally William H. Simon, The Community
Economic Development Movement, 2002 WIs. L. REV. 377, 380-81 (discussing how the
redevelopment process is characterized by substantial "write downs" and "sweetheart deals" for
private developers as an incentive to develop an area).
192. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677.
193. Id.
194. See Weston L. Johnson, Note, Benefits and Just Compensation in California, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 764, 765-66 (1969) (describing abuses in early railroad condemnations in California); see also
KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM 200 (Oxford University Press 1985) (discussing how such
abuse was particularly common in California, which suffered from a notoriously incestuous
relationship between its judiciary and railroad management).
195. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
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controversial decisions of the 2004 term, including Kelo.196 As for Kelo, his
defense of the Court's handiwork consisted primarily of the assertion that
since 1896 our cases (including an opinion by Justice Holmes) have
interpreted the term "public use" to mean "public purpose", and we
have upheld takings that served a valid public purpose even though
the property was either initially or ultimately transferred to private
owners. Moreover, in evaluating the validity of comprehensive
programs, we have focused on the purpose of the entire project,
rather than its impact on individuals who happen to own property in
the targeted area.
197
Unfortunately, this justification mangles history and does not accurately
depict what the Court had done in 1896, or how that judicial effort affected
the law of eminent domain in subsequent cases. To begin with, the 1896
case, Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,198 was not truly an eminent
domain case, and really had nothing to do with the Fifth Amendment's
"public use" clause. Fallbrook was a lawsuit by an Englishwoman invoking
federal diversity jurisdiction to enjoin the sale of her 40-acre lot by the
Irrigation District for her failure to pay a $51.31 assessment imposed on it. 99
Her rather quaint theory was that providing irrigation by the District was not
a permissible public purpose, and hence the assessment against her land was
invalid on substantive due process grounds. "It is communism and
confiscation under the guise of law," argued her counsel, Joseph H.
Choate.200 The Fallbrook court had no difficulty rejecting that argument by
196. Justice John Paul Stevens, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Judicial Predilections, Address
Before the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Judicial Predilections].
197. Id. Evidently Justice Stevens was referring to Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164
U.S. 112 (1896), which was not even a condemnation case, but one in which a property owner
whose land lay within an irrigation district sought to enjoin the sale of her property for nonpayment
of an assessment duly levied on her land by the District.
In the interest of accuracy, it should be noted that in 1896 the Court also decided United
States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), a right-to-take case. But the use sought to
be made of the condemned property in that case was for a national park covering the Gettysburg
battlefield, as clear a use by the public as can be imagined, and as can be attested to by anyone who
ever visited that national shrine.
198. 164 U.S. 112 (1896). In Kelo, the Court cited to Fallbrook for the proposition that "when
this Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the nineteenth century, it
embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose."' Kelo, 125
S. Ct. at 2662 (emphasis added). No explanation was offered why so departing from the
constitutional language was "more natural." I believe to a total certainty, beyond the possibility of
quibble, that were Justice Stevens to drop in on his neighbor to borrow a lawnmower, he would not
say "May I purpose your lawnmower?" He would more naturally say, "May I use your
lawnmower?"
199. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 114-22. The opening sentence of of the Fallbrook opinion reads:
"The decision in this case involves the validity of the irrigation act enacted by the legislature of the
State of California. Id. at 151. No one was trying to condemn anything from anybody.
200. Id. at 126.
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pointing out that under state law, irrigation of arid land was indeed a public
purpose by the terms of the state constitution and laws,20 1 that there was
nothing in the Due Process Clause to the contrary, and thus the assessment
was legal. The Court also noted that what the irrigation district was doing
met "public purpose" criteria, thus making the assessment proper.20 2
More important, whatever Justice Peckham may have said by way of
stray dictum about "public use," which was not in issue, the Fallbrook
opinion made it clear that "[a]ll landowners in the district have a right to a
proportionate share of the water, and no one landowner is favored above his
fellow in his right to the use of the water.2 0 3 Thus, even if one were to
make the same error that Justice Peckham made later in Clark-where he
wrongly characterized the Fallbrook issue as "whether the use of the water
was a public use when a corporation sought to take land by condemnation
under a state statute" 2°4"-the use of the water would still be plainly by the
public. Ironically, Ms. Bradley argued that this universal availability of
water to all landowners in the district was illegal in the sense that it was too
public because water was supplied to all, whether they needed it or not.20 5
One is left to wonder whether anyone on the Court, particularly all those
smart clerks who are supposed to check out citations for the Justices,
actually read the holding of Fallbrook, and its subsequent misuse in Clark v.
Nash, before proclaiming it to be the seminal authority in the Kelo
206
opinion.
The Fallbrook language noted by Justice Stevens properly spoke of
"public purpose"-not "public use"-because that was at issue in that case
inasmuch as Fallbrook was not a condemnation case but one challenging
government taxation powers. Nothing in Fallbrook, certainly nothing at
201. Id. at 159.
202. Id. at 164.
203. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
204. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (emphasis added). This judicial statement was
triply in error: (a) there was no "corporation "-the District was a government entity; (b) there was
not even a semblance of private use-as noted, "[a]ll landowners in the district" had the right to use
the water, Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 162; and (c) Fallbrook was not a case in which "the corporation "
sought to take land by condemnation-it was a lawsuit by a landowner challenging the validity of an
assessment.
205. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 156.
206. In Kelo, the Court stated that Fallbrook changed the law from "public use" to "public
purpose." Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663-64 (2005). It did no such thing. It
was not a condemnation case nor even an inverse condemnation case-it was a due process
challenge to the validity of legislation.
page 159 thereof (mistakenly cited by Justice Peckham in Clark),°7 decided
any condemnation issues, for none were before the court. This entire
judicial "public use/public purpose" edifice was thus built on the nonexistent
Fallbrook holding, and thus has no doctrinal or historical foundation
whatsoever.
20 8
Nor is Justice Stevens assisted by his reference to Justice Holmes' views
in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. 209  In Strickley, Justice
Holmes followed the factually and legally erroneous Clark v. Nash opinion
without examining its origins.2'0  This is understandable, particularly in
those days when the Justices were unassisted by a multiplicity of clerks as
they are now, and certainly could not be blamed for accepting the then one-
year-old and seemingly clear holding in Clark.
Insofar as Justice Stevens supported the idea that the needs of the "entire
project" take precedence over the "impact on individuals who happen to own
property in the targeted area," 211 he disregarded the Supreme Court's holding
(by Justice Holmes as it happens) that in eminent domain cases the
Constitution deals with people, not with tracts of land.21 2 Also, Justice
Stevens failed to recognize Justice Potter Stewart's more recent and
similarly astute point that property does not have rights-people do.2 13 It is
therefore difficult to see, and Justice Stevens provides no explanation, why
the needs of "the project" should take precedence over people's
constitutional rights any more than the needs of efficient, area-wide criminal
law enforcement should trump the guarantees of the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendment. Finally, though in eminent domain cases that challenge "public
use" the identity of the transferee may be significant, the issue is not, as
Justice Stevens apparently believed, whether the property is transferred to
other private owners. It has always been hornbook law that privately owned
public utilities, pipelines, railroads, universities, and even private individuals
can exercise the power of eminent domain when authorized to do so by the
207. Clark, 198 U.S. at 369. Thus, embarrassing as that may be, it appears that Justice Peckham
did not understand or remember his own decision in the Fallbrook case when he wrote in Clark v.
Nash that Fallbrook was a condemnation case by a "corporation." Id.
208. 1 would not ordinarily dream of saying this on my own in public print, but what Justice
Peckham did in Clark does call to mind the immortal line of Yale's beloved Professor Fred Rodell
who once suggested that the proper way to criticize a defective court opinion might be to say
"Justice Fussbudget, in a long-winded and vacuous opinion, managed to twist his logic and mangle
his history so as to reach a result that was not only reactionary but ridiculous." Fred Rodell,
Goodbye to Law Reviews - Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 280 (1962).
209. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
210. Id. at 531.
211. Judicial Predilections, supra note 196.
212. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
213. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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legislature.2t 4 It is the use of the taken land, not the identity of the taker or
user, that is decisive of whether the taking is for "public use."
Whether or not there are collateral benefits to the public in a private
taking is in no way decisive of the use to which the taken property is being
put. At least in the slum clearance cases, one can say that the "public
purpose" is the elimination of a social evil, as in Berman. But where one's
ownership is in no way objectionable and the taking is no more than a
candid municipal effort at lucrative "yuppification," as Michael Kinsley put
it,2II the "public" part of the asserted "public purpose" becomes difficult to
discern. It is disgraceful that the application this sort of thing permits the
wealthy to take advantage of the poor or of members of the lower middle
class. At least Robin Hood robbed the retinue of the Sheriff of Nottingham,
not the local villeins.
In the end Justice Stevens properly draws a distinction between policy
and law, arguing that the courts must follow the latter in disregard of the
former.216 While correct as an abstract proposition (that the Court often
honors in breach),2 17 with all due respect, this approach presupposes that the
decisional "law" of eminent domain on which the Court relied in Kelo is
divorced from policy, and that the Court is keeping the two separated. But
as shown above, in the cases relied on by Justice Stevens, public policy
(efficient resource exploitation, slum elimination, etc.) was the core reason
used as justification for the use of eminent domain, originally as a narrow
exception to the "'public use" limitation.218  Why similar policy
considerations should not animate development of eminent domain law in
the twenty-first century, precisely as it did in the nineteenth century, has not
been explained.
But even if you think I am wrong on this point, a problem still remains.
Every principle, legal or otherwise, can be carried to unjustifiable extremes.
In Kelo the Court failed to confront the question of when does the extension
of even a sound legal principle cross the line into reductio ad absurdum
territory. The reason why Kelo has been the subject of such intense and
widespread criticism across the country is that as is clear to the vast majority
of Americans, it did precisely that. Such failure has rightly caused
214. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1001 (West 1982); see also Linggi v. Garovotti, 286 P.2d 15, 17-18
(1955).
215. Kinsley, supra note 6.
216. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2688 (2005).
217. I resist the temptation to digress, but it seems only proper to mention that the Supreme Court
certainly does use policy to shape the law, with regularity. The subjects of death penalty and
affirmative action come to mind as conspicuous examples.
218. See supra notes 72 and 74.
widespread anger and dismay that, in a wooden application of an outmoded
rule, the revered Supreme Court of the United States could be guilty of such
an appalling lack ofjudgment and common sense.
Finally, the Kelo decision, made without reference to the compensation
element (on which the Berman decision ultimately hinged), is morally and
legally deficient. It is bad enough, for any reason, that someone like
Wilhelmina Derry, an eighty-seven-year-old widow is thrown out of the only
home she has ever known. But to do so for the enrichment of other private
parties without genuinely just compensation (or even any compensation in
the cases of displaced businesses) is utterly indefensible. While the Court
noted the existence of the undercompensation problem, it refused to deal
with it.2" 9  Far from making the Court's decision defensible, such
acknowledgment only brings to mind one of Ambrose Bierce's acerbic
comments on the law:
An Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was sitting by a river
when a Traveler approached and said:
"I wish to cross. Will it be lawful to use this boat?"
"It will," was the reply; "it is my boat."
The Traveler thanked him, and pushing the boat into the water
embarked and rowed away. But the boat sank and he was drowned.
"Heartless man!" said an Indignant Spectator. "Why did you not
tell him that your boat had a hole in it?"
"The matter of the boat's condition," said the great jurist, "was not
before me."22°
IX. CONCLUSION
"Eminent domain for private development is nothing more than a
market shortcut and nothing less than government-sanctioned bullying of the
people who least deserve it. ,221
219. Id.at2668n.21.
220. AMBROSE BIERCE, A Defective Petition, in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF AMBROSE BIERCE,
612 (5th ed. 1970).
221. Welch, supra note 49.
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Are there any limits to the plastic definition of the constitutional term
"public use" left after Kelo, or did the Supreme Court grant Professor Merrill
his wish? 222 The answer--or perhaps more accurately, non-answer-that the
Supreme Court gave us may as well have come from George Orwell
("public" means "private" and "use" means "purpose," or "prognosticated
municipal prosperity"),223 or, as your teenager might put it, "Whatever!"-
i.e., whatever each of the countless municipalities in each of the fifty states
may say it is. Whatever that may be, it isn't the principled constitutional law
that through the Bill of Rights is supposed to protect all citizens' basic
liberties from an overreaching government, much less from a self-serving,
government-business, profit-seeking alliance. No Americans, no matter how
poor and powerless, should be forcibly thrown out of their own homes and
undercompensated in the process; certainly not because another private party
wants to make money from their land without observing the basic societal
nicety of buying it in a voluntary transaction.224 Afortiori, it is nothing short
of scandalous that small business people should see their businesses
destroyed in a process that solemnly promises "just compensation," but in
the event leaves them uncompensated for the value of their businesses.
225
222. Professor Thomas W. Merrill has argued, presumably with a straight face, that attempts to
impose any substantive limit on the public use requirement by the judiciary are in the nature of a
"siren song," and that the only limits on the exercise of eminent domain should be procedural.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Misplaced Flight to Substance, 19 PROB. & PROP., (No. 2), Mar.-Apr. 2005,
at 16, 18. Thus, Professor Merrill implicitly posits that the constitutional framers must have been
absent-minded when they inserted so meaningless a phrase into the Bill of Rights. In fact, Professor
Merrill's proposed nostrums are already a large part of the law of eminent domain where they do
nothing to bring about the benefits he envisions. For a vivid example of how courts can simply run
roughshod over legislative procedural safeguards, see Yonkers Cmity. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335
N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975). See also Sonya Bekoff Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal:
Laissez-Faire for the Poor, Welfare For the Rich, 8 PAC. L.J. 627, 636-40 (1977) (commenting on
Morris).
In the end, Professor Merrill's argument brings to mind the line of My Fair Lady's Professor Henry
Higgins who opined that "the French never care what they do, actually, as long as they pronounce it
correctly." MY FAIR LADY (Warner Brothers 1964).
223. GEORGE ORWELL, Politics and the English Language (1946), reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED
ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL 127, 133 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds.,
1968).
224. 1 am not oblivious to the holdout problem, but the fact is that for several centuries Americans
have managed to build great cities and great private structures without resorting to forced
displacement of their less powerful fellow citizens. See Brief of John Norquist, President of the
Congress for New Urbanism as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London,
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811055. In the worst holdout cases it is only a case
of the old saw that all prayers are answered, but sometimes the answer is "no." Where is it written
that developers must always have their way?
225. A particularly vicious aspect of this noncompensability rule are cases in which business
property is condemned and turned over to other business owners including at times the displaced
business owner's competitors. See Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand
That the former business people's land is then turned over to other, more
municipally favored business people so they can profit from it is morally
intolerable, but that is just what the rule articulated in Kelo has endorsed.
Involuntary acquisition of people's homes should be unthinkable
without ample procedural safeguards and payment of full, genuinely 'just
compensation" that actually recompenses those being displaced for all their
demonstrable economic losses. That the courts have failed to insist on that
as a constitutional minimum before allowing such takings-if only to deem
it a part of the full cost of the project, or at least of the redevelopers' cost of
doing business-is a pervasive scandal in American law. Such practices do
indeed smack of kleptocracy, and justifiably bring the courts, and the
judicial system they administer, into public disrepute.
When viewed historically, the body of the U.S. Supreme Court
decisional law interpreting the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment is
not only a classic illustration of the slippery slope phenomenon, but also a
prime example of wooden judicial reasoning that stubbornly fails to
differentiate between the expressly voiced policy factors that inspired the
decisional law that emerged from occasional nineteenth century easement
takings-such as railroad rights of way across farmland or other sparsely
occupied territory that usually displaced no one-and today's mass
displacement of urban populations. Justice Thomas hit the bull's eye in his
dissent by pointedly noting that the Supreme Court's public use
jurisprudence is defective because the legal "doctrine" that emerges from
it-if one can properly use that term-is not the product of reasoned
development in the law but rather of blindly adopted rulings "with little
discussion of the [Eminent Domain] Clause's history and original
meaning .... ,226 Over forty years ago Professor Allison Dunham
concluded, after a study of three decades of Supreme Court eminent domain
law, that the Supreme Court's efforts in this field have been a failure.227
Little has changed since then-less still has changed for the better. Most
commentaries agree that the law of eminent domain, including its right-to-
take aspects, is defective.228 Justice Thomas was also right in insisting that
One Business Property ofAnother, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at AI; see also D. Michael Risinger,
Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises Are
Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 483, 526-40 (1985) (demonstrating that in the entire twentieth
century no commentator or treatise author (save one student note) has supported the judicial denial
of compensation for condemnees' business losses); Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property" Not
"Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of
Business Goodwill, 6 CAL. W. L. REv. 57, 61-64 (1969).
226. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The preceding
discussion of the misguided Fallbrook-Clark-Strickley progression is Exhibit A for Justice Thomas'
concerns. See supra notes 198-218 and accompanying text.
227. Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court
Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 63, 106 (1962).
228. See, e.g., James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69
MINN. L. REv. 1277 (1985); Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49
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America's twenty-first century law of eminent domain should rest on a
doctrinally sounder foundation than "Justice Peckham's high opinion of
[nineteenth century] reclamation laws ....
To the extent the Supreme Court's majority has chosen to tamper with
the meaning of language in disregard of society's moral fundamentals, it has
abdicated its responsibility for enforcement of a vital part of the Bill of
Rights, abandoning that task to the self-serving decisions of a horde of
unaccountable, faceless municipal politicians and bureaucrats. 30
The Constitution does not require courts to facilitate predatory behavior
by business-government alliances seeking to increase their cash flow by
depriving people of modest means of their homes. The Public Use clause is
not "hortatory fluff." Its plain meaning deserves judicial respect, no less
than other cherished constitutional provisions. Those who seek its
protection deserve a better judicial reception than the "thinly disguised
contempt" for their vital interests that is their frequent litigational lot.2 3 '
Thus, Justice Stevens' extrajudicial effort to depict himself as compelled by
law to endorse the enrichment of the developer and Pfizer by driving Suzette
Kelo and her neighbors from their modest homes without full compensation,
in no way justifies his irresponsible and profoundly immoral handiwork.232
(1999); Edward D. McKirdy, The New Eminent Domain: Public Use Defense Vanishing in Wake of
Growing Privatization of Power, 155 N.J.L.J. 1145 (1999); Jennifer Maude Klemetsrud, Note, The
Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 N.D. L. REv. 783 (1999); Jennifer J.
Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the Erosion of the
"Public Use" Requirement, 87 MiNN. L. REV. 543 (2002); Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private
Use and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409 (1983). For an extensive
collection of critical commentaries see Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing
Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 579, 580 n.7 (1995).
229. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687 (referring to Justice Peckham's opinion in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896), which spawned the line of cases relied on by the Supreme Court,
without noting that Fallbrook was not a condemnation case, that the irrigation district was a
government entity, and that the public (land owners within the irrigation district) would have the use
of the benefits of the irrigation project, thus making it an unobjectionable, use-by-the-public case).
230. To illustrate the disconnection between redevelopment functionaries and the community, on
July 22, 2005, 1 was a guest on an Adelphia cable TV talk show seen in the Los Angeles area. Week
in Review with Bob Jimenez (KADL Adelphia Channel television broadcast July 22, 2005). This
segment, from Episode #3198, was devoted to Kelo and eminent domain in general. Id. The panel
consisted of the host and four accomplished members of the professional and business communities
(an investment banker, an attorney, a political analyst, and the head of a government-oriented think
tank). Id. In order to dramatize the unaccountability of the local redevelopment apparatus, I offered
each panelist $100 if they could name any members of the Los Angeles Redevelopment Agency. Id.
None took me up on my offer. Id. Res ipsa loquitur.
231. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331, 1346 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (commenting on the judicial reception given to small property
owners complaining of uncompensated takings by the government).
232. This may sound cynical, but if my 40 years as an appellate lawyer in the field of eminent
domain have taught me anything, it is that when a judge starts going on about how unfortunate it is
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X. EPILOGUE
In a front-page story dated November 21, 2005 233 The New York Times
reports that in spite of the city's victory in the Supreme Court, the New
London redevelopment project is going nowhere as investors and lenders are
backing away due to the negative publicity. The developer refuses to go
ahead with construction of the waterfront hotel because-now they tell us-
"* .Pfizer, which built a major research center next to the site in the late
1990's and pushed for the Fort Trumbull redevelopment, has backed away
from a commitment to help pay for the hotel as the lawsuit dragged on.
' 23 4
Some renters are voicing their perceptions with their feet, and are moving in,
not out.
235
In the meantime, the State is out $73 million, with nothing to show for it
so far.23 6  "Elegant street lamps, intended to illuminate a gentrified new
riverfront, instead shine over empty lots where buildings have been leveled
but not replaced. ,
237
Your tax money at work.
that he must uphold "the law" which requires him to rule in a manner that is unfair to the property
owners, it is a safe bet that he is about to make a ruling that is not only offensive to prevailing
notions of fairness, but as often as not, is also not consistent with properly analyzed law. Nor is my
view unique. Justice Cardozo put it more eloquently:
Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic which
is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform
it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the
bidding of their office. The victim is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar
of regularity.... I suspect that many of these sacrifices would have been discovered to
be needless if a sounder analysis of the growth of the law, a deeper and truer
comprehension of its methods, had opened the priestly ears to the call of other voices.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (Greenwood Press 1975) (1924).
233. William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at Al.
234. Id. at A22 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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